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1 Introduction 
 In Finland there’s no extreme right or extreme left, the dividing line has for a long 
time been the People vs. the Elite. You apparently represent the Elite. 
- A local PS councilman from Köyliö, later expelled from the party for his explic-
itly racist views, defends himself against accusations of extreme-rightism on 
Facebook 20 February 2012. All translations are by the author of this study. 
The populist Finns Party’s (Perussuomalaiset, PS) 1 upsurge in the parliamentary elec-
tions of spring 2011 shocked the Finnish political scene, marking the most significant 
post-war shift in Finnish politics. The latest phase in a significant rising tide in support 
for nationalist populist parties in the Nordic countries2, formerly largely Social Democ-
ratic strongholds, made PS the third largest party in Finland with 19.1% of the vote, up 
from 4.1% in 2007 (Borg 2012a, 20). The last few decades have seen significant victo-
ries for nationalist populist parties all over Europe (see e.g. Mudde 2007). The PS can 
be seen as part of this development, but it also has roots in the Finnish Rural Party 
(Suomen maaseudun puolue, SMP, 1959–1995), its predecessor. 
In this thesis, I will analyse the specificity that the contemporary European populist 
phenomenon takes in the Finnish case. While the party has much in common with the 
rising European populist radical right, such as anti-immigration and anti-EU policies 
that are a reaction to societal developments such as globalization and individualization; 
its ideology and policies are also rooted in Finnish political culture, political history and 
the legacy of the SMP. I ask if PS politics in urban centres have much in common with 
the European populist radical right (e.g. Eatwell 2003; Hainsworth 2008; Mudde 2000, 
                                                 
1 Perussuomalaiset, previously often translated as the True Finns or Ordinary Finns, adopted the official 
English name The Finns in August 2011, after receiving international media attention (HS 21 August 
2011). 
2 In Norway, The Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet), the second-largest party since 1997 (Carr 1997), 
received 22.9% of the vote in 2009 (Statistics Norway 2009). In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats 
(Sverigedemokraterna) entered parliament for the first time in 2010 with 5.7% of the vote 
(Valmyndigheten 2010). Support for the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti) rose to 12.3% in 2011 
(Statistics Denmark 2011). 
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2004, 2007), whereas the rural PS is better described by studies on rural populism (e.g. 
Canovan 1999; Helander 1971; MacRae 1969; Minogue 1969; Taggart 2004; Wiles 
1969), with its ideological roots firmly in SMP’s agrarian populist politics. This study 
will analyse the PS in relation to historical Finnish populism and contemporary Euro-
pean populism via an analysis of PS candidates’ views in the Finnish 2011 parliamen-
tary elections, by method of content analysis informed by Luc Boltanski & Laurent 
Thévenot’s (1999, 2006) justification theory. 
Several theoretical explanations for the rise of populist parties in contemporary Europe 
have been formulated, and preliminary empirical explanations for the PS’ success have 
been suggested. However, theoretical explanations (see e.g. Eatwell 2003; Mudde 2004, 
2007; Oesch 2008) have largely conceptualized the parties as right-wing, which does 
not seem to be the whole truth about the PS (see chapter 2.4; Borg 2012c; Grönlund & 
Westinen 2012), while empirical explanations of the PS’ rise (see e.g. Borg 2012; 
Kantola et al. 2011; Rahkonen 2011) lack analysis on what does the party have in com-
mon with its European populist counterparts and what are its specificities. To study the 
PS as an extreme right party is not an adequate approach. While the party’s positions on 
some issues are right-wing (value conservatism), its economic policy is left-leaning 
(Borg 2012c, Grönlund & Westinen 2012). In many issues, the party transcends the tra-
ditional left–right continuum and politicizes new issues in new ways. 
This study attempts to remedy the aforementioned lacks and broaden our knowledge of 
the party and its significance to Finnish politics. While political science and electoral 
studies have given us vital contributions on the party (e.g. Borg 2012, Wiberg 2011), 
political sociology can deepen our understanding of dynamics of political justification 
and practices. The research questions to be answered are: How is Finnish political cul-
ture and history visible in the way the European populist phenomenon takes its 
shape in the PS? Is the PS geographically divided to a rural part with SMP rural 
populist roots and an urban part in line with the contemporary European populist 
radical right? 
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To answer these questions, I will analyse a new type of data, the Helsingin Sanomat 
Voting Advice Application (HS VAA) dataset, published online as open data by HS (6 
April 2011). This is combined with data on the municipalities of residence for candi-
dates (Ministry of Justice 2011) and a classification of municipalities by their popula-
tion density (Statistics Finland 2011a) to make the rural/urban comparison possible. The 
HS VAA data contains free-text answers to a political questionnaire of 31 questions by 
202 PS candidates, amounting to 85% of the PS candidates in the parliamentary elec-
tions of 2011. The dataset is unique and such a high response rate could not have been 
achieved by normal survey data collection methods, nor is such data yet available for 
other countries. Out of this dataset, answers to seven questions are picked: two on eco-
nomic redistribution and social justice, two on regional politics and three on globaliza-
tion. The data will be studied in light of existing research literature regarding the PS and 
its predecessors, Finnish political culture and current European populism, to extract the 
specificities of the Finnish case. 
I will first present the case of the PS’ rise and existing analyses on it, before moving on 
to my conceptualizations, methods, hypotheses and data. This will be followed by the 
main contribution of this study, the analysis of PS candidates’ pre-election discourse 
and justifications. Finally, I will present some concluding remarks. My results, in short, 
support the hypothesis that the party combines elements from agrarian populism and 
from contemporary radical right populism. The most dominant feature I found their dis-
course was strong support for the welfare state, justified with an ideal of equal rights in 
society, but with a strong anti-elitist bent. This was true especially of the rural part of 
the party. While there is a radical right populist bloc, it constitutes but a minority of the 
urban candidates, and the rural/urban divide is not as clear-cut as hypothesized. A typi-
cally Finnish conception of politics as taking care of common issues rationally and effi-
ciently, instead of as emotion-fuelled fierce debate (e.g. Luhtakallio 2012, 13–16, 178–
190; Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila 2011, 44–45), was found to be common even among 
populists in Finland. 
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2 The Rise of the Finns Party 
This literature review aims to show that while the Finnish party field has been relatively 
stagnant for decades and interest in politics has been low, especially rural working 
populations have now been mobilized by the PS in the aftermath of an election funding 
scandal, an immigration debate and the economic crisis in the EU. This largely explains 
why the PS’ rise happened when it did and connects the PS to the European nationalist 
populist phenomenon, but also highlights that the PS is a predominantly left-wing party, 
unlike some of its European counterparts, including the successful Norwegian and Dan-
ish populist parties (Paloheimo 2012, 342–343). 
Five years before the PS’ landslide victory of 2011, Elina Kestilä (2006) analysed the 
demand for what she calls radical right populism in Finland by using survey data of 
attitudes and comparing the Finnish case to other Nordic and Western European coun-
tries. Her theory is that low satisfaction with the political system and negative attitudes 
towards immigration facilitate radical right populist voting. She finds that while Finns 
are more satisfied with their political system than the electorates of most West European 
countries, attitudes towards immigrants and the political elite are quite negative (ibid., 
184), and concludes that there indeed is attitudinal demand for radical right populism 
within the Finnish electorate. 
She speculates that the lack of a politically attractive anti-immigration party, capable of 
tapping into the anti-immigrant sentiment, accounts for anti-immigrant attitudes not 
manifesting as electoral success (ibid., 187). What happened in those four years from 
her study in 2007 to the PS’ victory in 2011 that legitimated the PS vote to such an ex-
tent? Did satisfaction in the political system, one of the variables observed by Kestilä, 
decline? 
2.1 Declining Trust: The Campaign Funding Scandal of 2008–2011 
Indeed, one explanation is that trust in the political system and especially the main-
stream parties took a major blow with the election campaign funding scandal that domi-
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nated Finnish media in 2008–2011 (Kantola, Vesa & Hakala 2011, 78–79). While 
Finland has been considered to be one of the countries with the least public sector cor-
ruption (e.g. Transparency International 2011), the reality of political campaign funding 
began to unravel in public in 2008. On May 7, the Centre Party (Suomen Keskusta) MP 
Timo Kalli admitted on national television that he had not disclosed to the Ministry of 
Justice all campaign donations over 1700 Euros (Yle 7 May 2008), as required by the 
new campaign funding law of 2000. Kalli explained that even though this was a legal 
requirement, neglecting it was not punishable under the law, and he believed that this 
should be a matter between him and the donor. 
In the following weeks and months, it was revealed that it was in fact commonplace 
amongst politicians not to disclose their campaign donations, even though required by 
law. Many donors wished to remain anonymous. However, with relentless media pres-
sure on elected officials, many were now forced to open up details of their campaign 
funding. It emerged that a conglomerate of wealthy businessmen had set up a fund, 
Kehittyvien maakuntien Suomi (KMS, “Finland for Provincial Development”), which 
had close ties to the Centre Party, to the point of having been founded in the party office. 
The fund gave out substantial donations to politicians of the Centre Party and like-
minded candidates in other parties (Yle 9 February 2012). What cast a dubious light 
over this operation was the fact that several politicians who received the funding, in-
cluding Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen, had supported plans for large property devel-
opments, such as a shopping centre and a snowmobile factory, initiated by the same 
businessmen who were behind the KMS money. Thanks to relentless investigations by 
journalists, several other, smaller-scale scandals were also revealed during the three-
year political turmoil. These included the channelling of taxpayer money to fund the 
Centre Party via Finland’s Slot Machine Association (Raha-automaattiyhdistys, the 
state-owned charitable gambling monopoly). Several cases related to PM Matti 
Vanhanen were investigated but not brought to court, and he eventually resigned for 
“personal reasons” in the summer of 2010 (Kantola et al. 2011, 79–80). Only some of 
the accusations resulted in judicial processes, several of which are still pending at the 
time of writing. Nevertheless, the reputations of many politicians, mostly of the Centre 
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Party, were tarnished irreversibly. The first conviction was passed in the spring of 2012, 
when veteran National Coalition (Kansallinen Kokoomus) politician Ilkka Kanerva was 
convicted of receiving bribes and three businessmen of giving them. The businessmen 
received prison sentences of up to six years, Kanerva a fifteen-month suspended sen-
tence. However, all parties have appealed the decision and it will be reviewed by higher 
courts later. (HS 18 April 2012.) 
What were the effects of this corruption scandal for the 2011 elections? According to 
Kantola et al.’s (2011) survey data, party loyalty was exceptionally low in the lead-up to 
the election. In the survey, performed before the election, 40% of participants reported 
intending to vote for a different party than in the previous elections of 2007. A third of 
these reported the campaign funding scandal as a reason for the move. Of PS voters, 
however, over half reported it as their reason for the decision. (Ibid., 152.) Also, the PS 
was the most successful in mobilizing voters, that is, attracting the votes of those who 
did not vote at all previously (Borg 2012b, 137). 
Mattila & Sundberg (2012) find that the election funding scandal hit the Centre Party 
the hardest. 72% of respondents to their survey said their view of the Centre Party had 
changed for the worse because of the scandal. For the National Coalition, this number 
was 53% and for the Social Democratic Party (Suomen sosialidemokraattinen puolue, 
SDP), 36%. However, 30% said their view of the PS had changed for the better. 
(Mattila & Sundberg 2012, 235–238.) Thus, the PS vote seems at least partly to be ex-
plained as a protest vote (see e.g. Eatwell 2003, 51–52) against the mainstream parties. 
However, it should not be dismissed as just a protest vote in the aftermath of a crisis; 
instead, the PS vote is indeed backed by an ideology, shown by e.g. Grönlund & Westi-
nen (2012), discussed in chapter 2.4. 
2.2 Similarities to the Finnish Rural Party’s 1970s Success 
The election funding scandal described in the previous passage also bears similarities to 
the so-called Salora scandal of the 1970s, which coincided with an electoral victory for 
the Finns Party’s predecessor, the Finnish Rural Party (SMP, Suomen maaseudun 
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puolue) in 1979. In the Salora case, the head of the Finnish tax administration, among 
other high-ranking government officials, was forced to resign after being convicted of 
receiving bribes from the CEO of Salora, a Finnish electronics manufacturer. Salora’s 
CEO had attempted to influence a political decision to found a state-owned factory for 
production of cathode ray tubes used in manufacturing television sets. Several govern-
ment ministers were charged for receiving bribes, but were acquitted. (Kantola & Vesa 
2011, 47–48.) The populist SMP cashed in on the scandal. The Social Democrats, im-
plicated in the scandal, crashed in the 1979 parliamentary elections, whereas the SMP 
gained seven seats in parliament, up from two. 
However, this was not the first success for the rural populist party. The SMP had gained 
as much as 18 seats already in the elections of 1970 (Sänkiaho 1971, 22), before declin-
ing towards 1979, and then succeeding again in the wake of the Salora scandal. 
Sänkiaho (ibid., 30–37) explains the late 1960s rise of the SMP with five societal devel-
opments: first, the development of mass media, mainly television, distributing pictures 
of the wealth of urban centres into the countryside; second, the large-scale migration 
from the countryside to the cities in 1960s Finland; third, industrialization; fourth, the 
political environment (actions of other parties, mainly the failings of the Centre Party); 
and fifth, group behaviour (strong opinion leaders in rural villages). 
For Sänkiaho (1971), the importance of the spread of mass media in 1960s Finland must 
be seen in context of the post-war cultural atmosphere. He interprets the legacy of the 
1918 Finnish civil war as one that instated traditional peasant community values in the 
whole country. He argues that the victors, the right-wing White army, were predomi-
nantly rural, nationalistic land-owning peasants, while the defeated radical left-wing 
Reds represented urban Finland. The post-civil war unification of Finland was done on 
the terms of the victors. Up to the 1960s, schoolbooks and films depicted peasant com-
munities and their norms. (Ibid., 30.) Television, popularized in Finland only in the 
1960s, was the first medium to spread images of urban lifestyle and more liberal norms, 
together with images of urban wealth. This coincided with the demise of the farming 
economy. Together with industrialization, mass migration to the cities created large-
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scale rural poverty and rising tax rates in rural areas. These structural and cultural 
changes resulted in widespread rural discontent. (Ibid., 31–33.) 
Meanwhile, the Centre Party (renamed in 1965, previously the Agrarian League, Maal-
aisliitto) now tried to cater to urban voters as well. Instead, they lost their foothold in 
the countryside, and rural voters turned to the SMP. Many of them felt that by voting 
SMP they were not actually changing parties but sticking to true Agrarian politics 
against the “turncoats” of the Centre Party. (Ibid., 34–35.) 
Studies of the SMP not only shed light on the PS’ ideological roots, but also serve as a 
reminder that the often-cited description of Finnish political culture as one of pacific 
consensus (e.g. Karvonen & Paloheimo 2005, 297–298) is not a monolithic, determinis-
tic and unchanging “national character”. Helander (1971) identifies as key characteris-
tics of the Finnish political system “the consistency of the power relations of parties and 
the radical divisions and intensity of power struggles between parties” (ibid., 9). He 
goes on to describe the Finnish political culture as “relatively broken” (ibid.). “The con-
sistency of the power relations of parties” clearly refers to the dominance of the Social 
Democrats and the rural Centre Party, with the conservative National Coalition as a 
strong third. This did continue to be the case until recent developments in the new mil-
lennium. However, the description of “radical divisions” and “intense power struggles” 
between parties and a “broken” political culture is almost the opposite of typical modern 
descriptions of the pacific and consensual Finnish political system and culture, and this 
was only in 1971. 
Whereas Helander (1971) and Sänkiaho (1971) interpret the rise of the SMP as a not 
very surprising backlash against modernization, an attempt at return to rural peasant 
community values instated in the civil war of 1918, perhaps the PS’ rise as well should 
not have come as much of a shock. This might be argued especially given the geo-
graphical consistency between SMP and PS voting (Borg 2012b), and considering that 
the main explanatory factors presented for the PS’ rise by Borg (2012c, see chapter 2.4) 
are fairly similar to the ones used to explain the SMP in 1971: failings of the Centre 
Party, media effects and discontent over modernization. Only this time, the rural discon-
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tent is not over industrialization and urbanization, but globalization and European inte-
gration, discussed in the following. 
2.3 The Immigration Debate and the Euro Crisis in the Media 
Another prevalent theme in the lead-up to the 2011 elections, in addition to the cam-
paign funding scandal, was immigration policy (Pernaa 2012, 31), a discussion largely 
dominated by the Finns Party. The debate was to a large extent initiated by the anti-
immigration “wing” of PS and led by the (later elected) parliamentary candidate and 
Helsinki councilman Jussi Halla-aho. The challenge to debate met one of the first offi-
cial responses by mainstream parties in 2010, when the Social Democrats announced 
that they were preparing a new immigration programme under the slogan “maassa maan 
tavalla” (when in Rome, do as the Romans do) – a reference to requiring immigrants to 
adopt Finnish ways of life. This was seen as an attempt by SDP to salvage as many 
votes as possible that were being siphoned off by the PS. Soon after, chairman of the 
National Coalition, Jyrki Katainen, made reference to the need to “accept diverse opin-
ions on immigration”, seen as a nod to the immigration critics. (Ibid., 32.) 
According to Pernaa (2012), the immigration debate died down to some extent already 
in 2010 and did not become such a salient topic in the electoral campaigns of 2011 as 
was anticipated. Instead, other issues became dominant. However, according to opinion 
polls, the surge in PS support took place in 2010, at the time of the peak of the immigra-
tion debate (ibid., 32). With that in mind, the debate can indeed be seen as one of the 
main factors legitimizing the PS vote. 
Pernaa (2012) has conducted a broad media study of the prevalent topics in Finnish 
newspaper and television media in the run-up to the 2011 election (1.1.–17.4.2011). He 
finds that during that time, issues seen as “owned”3 by the PS dominated Finnish news-
paper publicity (immigration in 2010, EU economic crisis in early 2011). Also, the 
                                                 
3 On issue ownership, see Petrocik 1996. 
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party and its success itself, in the form of news about its campaign opening, popularity 
and poll success, were dealt with extensively. According to Pernaa’s study, the party 
was able to all but dominate the political discussion in the run-up to the elections (Per-
naa 2012, 39–40). Not only did the surge in PS support take place in 2010, when the 
immigration debate hit its peak (ibid., 32), but right before the elections, the Euro bail-
outs became a major debate the PS could tap into. The discontent at supporting the cri-
sis economies of the EU seems to have been a major factor in PS voting (Borg 2012d, 
250). PS candidates’ responses to this issue will be analysed in chapter 6.3. 
2.4 Survey Research: Dissecting the PS Vote 
Studying survey data on PS voters of 2011, blue-collar workers and entrepreneurs were 
overrepresented (Grönlund & Westinen 2012, 161; Rahkonen 2011, 427). Age groups 
were fairly evenly represented (Grönlund & Westinen 2012, 161), but as much as 67% 
of PS voters were men (Grönlund & Westinen 2012, 159; Rahkonen 2011, 428; Suho-
nen 2011, 66). This partly explains why the PS succeeded in geographical areas with 
high percentages of industrial workers and high unemployment rates. It has to be noted 
that many are the same areas in which the SMP succeeded in the 1970s and 1980s (Borg 
2012c, 195–197). Also, there was a strong positive correlation between the rise in turn-
out in an area and PS support, suggesting that the PS was very successful in mobilizing 
previously inactive voters. Even stronger was the correlation with male turnout. (Ibid., 
196). 
Grönlund & Westinen (2012) suggest that Finland is politically divided into wealthy 
urban Finland, where the conservative National Coalition and the Social Democrats 
dominate, and rural, sparsely populated Finland, which was previously dominated by 
the Centre Party, but where the Finns Party has now strongly taken hold. In urban 
Finland, the PS mainly siphoned off the traditional workers’ party SDP’s votes, whereas 
the National Coalition vote remained almost untouched. The PS’ victory was mainly a 
loss of the Centre Party and the SDP. This, as well, would suggest a difference in PS 
voter and candidate profiles of rural and urban areas which I will examine in this study. 
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Grönlund & Westinen also built seven compound variables based on a voter values sur-
vey to plot political positioning of different parties’ voters on seven two-dimensional 
axes. Their variables were left–right (market liberalism and income inequality), centre–
periphery (regional policy), sovereignty–alliance (with regards to EU and NATO), 
elite–people (trust/distrust towards politicians), monolingualism–bilingualism (Finnish 
and Swedish), traditionalism–open-mindedness (immigration, multiculturalism, sexual 
minorities) and growth–ecology. 
On a socioeconomic left–right scale, PS voters received a slightly left-leaning score 
along with SDP (Grönlund & Westinen 2012, 171). This also corresponds to self-
reported positioning, where PS voters ranked themselves averagely slightly left-leaning, 
close to the political centre, although the standard deviation was higher than that of 
other parties (Borg 2012c, 198–199). 
On the centre–periphery scale, perhaps surprisingly, it was found that the PS voters em-
phasized regional politics less than all the other parties’ voters, the Greens notwith-
standing (Grönlund & Westinen 2012, 174). This might be due to the fact that the Cen-
tre Party has a long history as the advocate of regional politics. Also, the authors state 
that the narrow dispersion of opinions on this scale casts some doubt on the reliability of 
this indicator. Nevertheless, they interpret this as the party voter base moving away 
from their SMP roots. I will analyse regionalism of PS candidates in chapter 5, and find 
that according to my data, contrary to what Grönlund & Westinen found of voters, re-
gional politics and local democracy in peripheral municipalities seem to be quite impor-
tant for PS candidates in both rural and urban constituencies. 
On the sovereignty–alliance axis, unsurprisingly, the PS voters score most strongly for 
national sovereignty; on the people–elite scale, again unsurprisingly, most strongly for 
the people against the elite; and similarly, most strongly for monolingualism, against 
bilingualism. On the traditionalism–open-mindedness scale, they are surpassed in con-
servatism only by the Christian Democrats. Finally, on the growth–ecology scale, per-
haps unexpectedly, the PS voters score very strongly for growth. This can be explained 
by the fact that they have gradually built up their policy as a reaction to the value-liberal, 
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ecological and climate-conscious policy advocated by the Greens (Vihreä liitto). Also, 
many environmental policies advocated by the Greens – such as fishing restrictions and 
the new sewage law debated in 2010 and early 2011 – mostly affect rural regions, where 
the PS is strong. Emphasizing economic growth can be interpreted as a liberal right-
wing position and in conflict with a left-leaning economic position. (Grönlund & 
Westinen 2012, 171–177.) My findings on PS candidates’ economic policy, discussed 
in chapter 4, indicate that this is an issue where PS candidates are quite divided. 
From these voter survey findings, we should note not just the attitudinal positioning of 
PS voters, but also the fact that on five out of the seven axes, PS voters ranked at the 
very end of the scale, out of the eight largest parties that were compared. This confirms 
the party’s status as a radical challenger of Finnish consensus politics. (Grönlund & 
Westinen 2012, 178.) However, the Greens could just as well be viewed as such, having 
ranked at the (opposite) end of four of the seven axes. 
Borg, on the other hand, also based on a voter survey, identifies major political currents 
that contributed to the rise of the PS in 2011 (2012c, 194–195; 2012d, 250). These were 
the election funding scandal, the immigration discussion and the global economic melt-
down. The most commonly cited reasons for PS voting by voters themselves were “a 
desire to shake up the stagnant party system”, “a desire to tighten immigration policy”, 
“a desire to curb Finland’s commitments to the EU”, and the media-savvy chairman of 
the party, Timo Soini (Borg 2012c, 200–209). It is notable that immigration policy, EU 
policy and chairman Soini, reported by PS voters as reasons for voting, correspond 
closely to the most visible politics stories in the media, discussed previously. Borg’s 
note on PS voting as protest against stagnant politics, however, warrants further exami-
nation. 
2.5 Consensus or Stagnation: Finnish Political Culture and Populism 
While contemporary Finnish politics is widely regarded as non-confrontational, fairly 
stable and based on negotiation instead of intense debate, conflict and rivalry (Karvonen 
& Paloheimo 2005, 297–298; Sänkiaho 1971, 30; Ylä-Anttila 2010, 98–103), consensus 
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politics are founded not only on broad common denominators but also the exclusion of 
options (Saari 2010, 469) and can be perceived as stagnation. The relative fixation of 
the Finnish party field in the late 20th century can be explained by a situation where the 
division of the mainstream parties corresponded strongly to the societal class structure 
and the left–right divide was clear, and also by geopolitical realities, namely Finland’s 
position neighbouring the Soviet Union. Even fairly substantial electoral changes did 
not really manifest themselves in government formation, actuated by the president, dur-
ing Urho Kekkonen’s multi-term era of 1958–1982. Even though turnouts momentarily 
increased at the end of this phase, they soon started declining again. Finnish attitudes 
towards political parties have to this day been largely indifferent, even hostile. There 
has been an inherent anti-elitism dormant in the Finnish electorate, which has created a 
suitable breeding ground for a party protesting against supposed consensus, portraying 
it as stagnation. (Alapuro 1997; Alapuro 2010; Borg 2012c; Sänkiaho 1971, 30; Ylä-
Anttila 2010, 98–103.) However, it should also be noted that this fertile breeding 
ground, set by Finns’ low interest and trust in politics, was at least to some extent 
changed by the 2011 elections. Elo & Rapeli (2012, 289) find that the elections in-
creased Finns’ interest in politics, especially among young people. 
Of course, the spirit of consensus did not mean that all political rivalry, disagreements 
or conflicts were swept under the rug, even if politics was comparatively pacific for 
decades. Neither can “political culture” be used as an explanation by itself, as political 
cultures are historically forged and in constant flux. The rise of the PS must be seen as 
indicative of a gradual breakdown of this consensual system. While the consensus was 
broad and inclusive, consensus always has to exclude some views, those that are just too 
extreme to assimilate. The consensus was a consensus agreed upon by the elite (Saari 
2010, 476), and populist rhetoric is an effective critique against such a system. 
Additionally, this perceived stagnation of the political field, attributed to political his-
tory, reminds us to consider how the Finnish case differs from the Scandinavian coun-
tries. Perhaps the late arrival of the populist phenomenon to Finland, compared to the 
Scandinavian countries, can be attributed to this stagnation of politics due to historical 
specificities.  
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In a comparison of Nordic populist party voters, Paloheimo (2012, 333) notes that 
whereas in Sweden, Norway and Denmark, populist party voters are mainly of middle 
and low income classes, the PS in Finland has managed to appeal to all income classes, 
even the high earners. This is especially noteworthy in light of the party’s left-leaning 
economic policy. 
Another Finnish specificity is that while in all of the Nordic countries, populist party 
voters view politics as “too complicated to understand” more often than voters of other 
parties, in Finland, both populist and mainstream party voters thought so notably more 
often than in the other Nordic countries (ibid., 340). Paloheimo explains this, again, 
with Finnish consensus politics, lacking the simplicity of a “government vs. opposition” 
setting. 
He also notes the left-leaning economic position of PS voters. While the Swedish De-
mocrat voters’ positioning is somewhat similar, the Danish and Norwegian populist 
party voters are decidedly right-wing on a self-reported scale (ibid., 342–343). While 
the anti-immigration and anti-integration sentiment that has recently spread in Europe 
found its home in anti-tax right-wing parties founded in the 1980s in Denmark and 
Norway, it attached itself to the PS in Finland. The roots of the PS lie in rural left-
leaning anti-industrialization populism (SMP) of the 1970s, which partly explains why 
Finnish populism is more left-wing in nature. 
Also noteworthy is that despite long traditions of consensus politics and coalition gov-
ernments, there are still strong ideological divides between the voters of different Fin-
nish parties, both on left–right and conservative–liberal axes. This is true not just of 
those voting for the PS and the Greens, but mainstream parties as well. Also, there 
seems to be no basis to label the PS vote as a mere protest vote with no significant ideo-
logical content (e.g. Eatwell 2003, 51–52). According to the voter survey findings dis-
cussed above, the PS is a left-leaning but value-conservative and populist workers’ 
party, which makes it almost a mirror image of the Greens. 
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These findings highlight why it is problematic to apply the canon of scholarship on 
European populist radical right parties to the PS. However, I hypothesize that scholar-
ship on radical right-wing populism does apply to the urban part of the party, whereas 
their politics in rural areas are better analysed by referring to texts on traditional rural 
populism. 
Summarizing this review of literature on the PS, it seems that the party is value-
conservative but predominantly left-wing, with a male rural worker as a typical voter 
but appealing to even urban high earners. It is a reactionary populist party opposed to 
mainstream party consensus with views critical of the EU, globalization and immigra-
tion. The Euro crisis and declining trust in mainstream parties gave the party its oppor-
tunity. While the party has already been classified by some as populist radical right 
based on its programmes (e.g. Arter 2010), I believe that its nationalism and value con-
servatism are insufficient grounds for such a label, considering its left-wing economics. 
In fact, labelling the party is of minor interest here – instead, my interest lies in how 
political dynamics and cultural aspects mould the arguments and justifications of party 
representatives, how do they do politics and why. This is why my study will analyse the 
political argumentation of PS candidates with a framework of political sociology, de-
scribed in what follows. 
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3 Conceptualization, Methodology, Hypotheses and Data 
In this chapter, I will present my conceptual and theoretical framework for analysis. 
This will include discussions on the concept of populism, on Luc Boltanski and Laurent 
Thévenot’s justification theory, a presentation of my hypotheses and of my data, the 
Helsingin Sanomat Voting Advice Application open data for the Finnish parliamentary 
elections of 2011. 
3.1 Populism 
Early works on populism (Ionescu & Gellner 1969, Canovan 1982) largely conceptual-
ized the phenomenon as one of agrarian protest against modernization, with peripheries 
rebelling against the elites of centres, in a nostalgic ideology wishing to reinstate an 
“agrarian gemeinschaft” of traditional rural community values (MacRae 1969, 156). 
Following this, these conceptions of populism were used in analysing the SMP in 
Finland (Helander 1971). With a new version of European right-wing radicalism emerg-
ing, some scholars have turned to theories of populism, modifying them to fit the new 
situation, merging the concept with studies on the radical right (e.g. Mudde 2000, 2004, 
2007). Some (e.g. Canovan 1999; Laclau 2005a, 2005b; Taggart 2004), on the other 
hand, have continued to develop the concept of populism in a way that is not specific to 
right-wing movements. However, I wish to argue that for the Finnish case, both these 
two discussions, the classical one on rural populism updated to a broader conception of 
populism; and the newer, specific version of the contemporary populist radical right, are 
useful. The PS combines two ideological strains: the rural populist legacy of the SMP 
and contemporary European populist radical rightism. The SMP’s rural populist legacy 
is what gives the party its left-wing ideological roots, with populism manifesting as 
strong support for the rural poor, while contemporary European populist radical right 
ideology gives the party its anti-immigration and anti-EU alignment. 
Indeed, most conceptualizations of contemporary European nationalist parties used to-
day include the term right-wing in one form or another, including “far right”, “extreme 
right”, “radical right”, “populist right”, “new right” or some combination of these, such 
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as “populist radical right”. (Hainsworth 2008, 5–7; Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2007, 242.) 
The particular selection of parties examined varies to some degree, but it typically in-
cludes parties such as the French Front National (FN), The Freedom Party of Austria 
(FPÖ), The Swiss People’s Party (SVP), the Netherlands’ Party for Freedom (PVV), the 
Swedish Democrats (SD), the Danish People’s Party (DF) and the Norwegian Progress 
Party (FrP). While some of these parties can indeed be categorized as 
far/radical/extreme right, the PS is not adequately described as such. The traditional 
left–right divide is, to some extent, a thing of the past for many of these parties. They 
are often voted for by workers, but also by white-collar voters, and their economic pol-
icy is not what defines them. Their voter bases are not very strictly socioeconomically 
determined, and they are not interest groups of social classes. The left–right divide is 
increasingly replaced by new modes of politicization, around questions such as multi-
culturalism, nationalism, permissiveness, tolerance and authoritarianism. (Eatwell 2003, 
52–56; Rydgren 2007, 246.) 
This is why I prefer using the concept of populism, without the additional “right-wing” 
qualifier, taking into account both the literature on agrarian populism and the one on 
contemporary radical right populism. Populism is a label the party itself acknowledges, 
too, while condemning both the “left” and the “right” (PS 2011, 6). 
While the concept of populism is an elusive and disputed one, Cas Mudde’s (2004) 
definition synthesizes many others and is sufficient to serve as a starting point for the 
needs of this study: 
“[A]n ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homoge-
neous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which 
argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté generale (general will) of the 
people.” (Ibid., 543.) 
Mudde defines populism not as a political rhetoric or style, but an ideology; however, it 
is a “thin-centred” one (ibid., 544), thus it can be combined with very different left- and 
right-wing ideologies. The core concept for populism, undoubtedly, is that of “the peo-
ple”, the righteous views of which the populists claim to represent. According to Mudde, 
18 
 
this “people” of the populists is a mythical construction, a sub-set of the whole popula-
tion, best described by Benedict Anderson’s (1983) notion of an imagined community. 
Thus, common populist arguments often deal with who actually belongs to “the people”, 
whether it is explicitly expressed or merely implied (as in “we should take care of our 
own problems first before helping others”, where “us” refers to ethnic nationals and 
“others” to immigrants). 
To be clear, I expect there to be no such thing as “pure” populism that would fit this 
description perfectly, or anything like an “exclusively populist” (Taggart 2004, 270) 
party. Rather, Mudde’s definition is here understood as an ideal type of populism, like 
Taggart (2004, 273) advocates the use of the concept. Empirical cases are expected to 
correspond to this definition of populism to differing degrees, making it useful as an 
analytical category. 
Mudde does argue that populism is not just a right-wing phenomenon, but instead, it is 
inherent to contemporary politics, hence his expression “the populist Zeitgeist” (2004). 
He argues that the New Left movement of post-1968 and the Green parties’ rise since 
the 1980s were populist movements par excellence (Mudde 2004, 548), in presenting 
themselves as fierce critics of a misguided “political elite”. But he also believes that 
today’s populism is largely “associated with the (radical) right” because there is often a 
connection between populism and nationalism, since “[t]he step from ‘the nation’ to 
‘the people’ is easily taken, and the distinction between the two is often far from clear” 4 
(ibid., 549). The fact that the PS is strongly nationalist but seems to combine left- and 
right-wing policy casts doubt on Mudde’s focus on “rightism”. 
                                                 
4 We should note that this is especially true in Finnish, where the word kansa carries both meanings, the 
nation and the people, thus connecting the concepts even in everyday language. The word is one of the 
staple concepts in the party’s vocabulary, often used by the PS chairman Timo Soini in his trademark 
proverb, borrowed from his mentor, Veikko Vennamo of the SMP, “kyllä kansa tietää” (“the peo-
ple/nation know(s)”). This implies, in typical populist fashion, that true political knowledge rests within 
the conscience of the people. 
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As for the causes of the current populist Zeitgeist, Mudde presents several explanations, 
of which he focuses most on the changed role of the media and what he calls the 
“emancipation” of citizens (ibid., 552–556). He argues that because of increasing mar-
ket competition between private media, there is a tendency to focus on extreme or scan-
dalous views, simply to sell newspapers. Populist politicians fit this bill very well. The 
“emancipation” of citizens refers to better education and political awareness. Citizens 
demand more political representation and challenge established parties more eagerly. 
Finally, Mudde analyses reactions to the populist “threat” (as perceived by the chal-
lenged mainstream parties) (ibid., 557–562). He argues that reactions emphasizing de-
liberative democracy, for example, are counter-productive, because the populist call for 
“more democracy” is a call for better outputs (i.e. materialization of the populists’ de-
mands) rather than better inputs (i.e. participation). This is a view that can be disputed, 
both on theoretical and empirical grounds, for example with regards to the initiatives by 
many populist parties (e.g. the SVP in Switzerland) towards direct democracy such as 
referenda. Additionally, scholars of populism have made the point that populism thrives 
specifically because the outputs of democracy can never fully match the inputs. This is a 
structural feature of representative democracy, and can be conceptualized as a gap be-
tween the wish for mirror representation and the wish for expert rule (Papadopoulos 
2002, 48) or a tension between “redemptive” and “pragmatic” democracy (Canovan 
1999). Populism rears its head at times when the legitimacy of democracy is in crisis, 
but tends to be short-lived because its logic is the logic of a movement, of constituting a 
people, not of prolonged rule. Taggart (2004, 276, 284–286) refers to this as populism’s 
self-limiting quality, Canovan (1999, 14) even sees it as democracy’s self-repair system: 
populism provides temporary inspiration when the gap between hopes of redemption 
through politics and the reality of everyday pragmatic decision-making is too big. 
Whereas Mudde sees populism as an ideology, Ernesto Laclau (2005a, 2005b) sees it as 
a mode of politicization. To him, populism is a logic of articulation resulting in the dis-
cursive construction of a people. In populism, “a plebs [...] claims to be the only legiti-
mate populus – that is, a partiality [...] wants to function as the totality of the commu-
nity” (2005a, 81). Here, a particular group attempts to present itself as universal, “the 
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people”, constructing “chains of equivalence” between different political claims and 
thus constituting the people as a political subject vis-à-vis the elite. To Laclau, populism 
is not a derogatory term, nor should populist movements be dismissed as simplifying or 
demagogic. Instead, for Laclau, the logic of populism is inherent in all politics. (Ibid., 
18.) This is, for the purposes of this study, quite similar to Mudde’s conception, despite 
Laclau’s advanced discursive ontology and conceptualizations. Whereas Laclau talks of 
populism as a logic and Mudde as a “thin-centred ideology” (Mudde 2004, 544), Mudde, 
too, actually focuses on the populist logic in his definition, instead of its ideological 
contents. However, in his empirical work, Mudde studies right-wing parties, which un-
necessarily limits his field of vision. 
Indeed, the broad allegations of corruption against the Finnish political elite brought on 
by the election funding scandal, discussed previously, surely facilitated the PS’ ability 
to claim themselves as the representative of the “pure people” against the “corrupt elite”, 
in Mudde’s terms. However, while populism presents itself as a pure-hearted opponent 
to the elite, there is reason to believe that rural and urban populist strains within the PS 
are differentiated by where they claim these elites to reside. Rural populism, hypotheti-
cally, claims the oppressors are located in the affluent elites of cities, banks and corpo-
rations, whereas urban right-wing populism blames permissive, altruistic cultural elites 
for defending immigration, globalization and multiculturalism. In this study, such 
claims by PS candidates will be investigated by methodology discussed in the following. 
3.2 Methodology 
Methodology for this study will consist of a sociological content analysis (Saaranen-
Kauppinen & Puusniekka 2006, ch. 7.3.2) of questionnaire answers by PS parliamentary 
candidates, informed by the justification theory of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot 
(Boltanski & Thévenot 1999, 2006; Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila 2011; Thévenot 2007, 
2011a, 2011b). Content analysis involves creating categorizations of themes in texts that 
are relevant to the study at hand; coding, or classifying, excerpts of text into these cate-
gories; and interpretative readings of these categorized excerpts. The categorization and 
analysis is informed by a hypothetical model of urban and rural groups of PS candidates, 
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presented in the next chapter, which I base on the research on populism and PS pre-
sented above and on Boltanski and Thévenot’s theory of justification. 
The categorizations of the hypothetical model manifest themselves in different ways 
when processing the candidates’ answers to different questions. This is why each ques-
tion was analysed separately and a codebook created during analysis for each question, 
instead of drafting a codebook before the analysis phase. The analytical framework, 
based on studies of populism, the PS case, Finnish political culture and Boltanski & 
Thévenot’s theory of justification, facilitates finding classifications in the data but does 
not dictate them beforehand, avoiding overly rigid preconceived interpretations. This 
approach also makes it possible to employ justification theory more intensively in the 
questions in which it is relevant for analysis and more loosely or not at all in analyses 
that do not benefit from it. 
Because I am analysing party candidates acting within an established parliamentary 
polity, my interest lies not only in the way PS candidates justify their positions, but also 
in the positions themselves, including categorizations such as the political left and right. 
This means that a rigorous and systematic application of Public Justifications Analysis 
(Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila 2011), influenced by Political Claims Analysis by Koop-
mans & Statham (1999), would be unsuitable. However, incorporating justification the-
ory is highly relevant because I am interested in the effects of political cultures and 
practices for the PS. This is why I have opted for a loose interpretation of justification 
analysis, which can be described as content analysis informed by justification theory. 
To briefly explicate justification theory, Boltanski & Thévenot (2006) argue that in 
moral or political conflict, actors have to justify their positions to one another in com-
munication, in order to reach a non-violent result to the dispute. They do this by basing 
their argument on universally accepted “orders of worth”, or worlds of justification 
(civic, market, inspired, fame, industrial, domestic and ecological). In each of these or-
ders, the worth of a person, argument or object is determined by different means. The 
orders are “different kinds of common good” (Boltanski & Thévenot 1999, 365), which 
means that appealing to them includes a conception of a common humanity, making it 
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possible for the other party of the dispute to measure worth on the same, common scale. 
The presumption for an actor that presents a justified claim is that the other party of the 
dispute can appreciate the justification and assess its worth similarly. This is one way 
how commonality is possible, an explanation for the social bond. 
Boltanski & Thévenot have explicated seven worlds of justification, although they do 
not claim the list would be final and comprehensive, or that these worlds of justification 
would be used similarly in different cultural spheres. In the civic world, worth is deter-
mined by the good of the community and its general will. In the market world, worth is 
determined by competition and possession of goods that others lust. In the inspired 
world, worth comes directly from an external and exclusive source of worth, such as 
divinity, or a pure idea of beauty, for instance. In the world of fame, appreciation of 
others is the sole source of worth. In the industrial world, what is most efficient is most 
worthy, constituting a world of calculating positive and negative effects of rationally 
chosen options. In the domestic world, hierarchies, based on tradition and ancestry, de-
fine worth. Finally, in the world of ecology, biodiversity and environmentality deter-
mine worth. Reference to one of these types of worth is made when justifying an argu-
ment in the public sphere. (Boltanski & Thévenot 1999.) 
Conceptualizing politics through this theory, Luhtakallio and Ylä-Anttila (2011, 44–45; 
Luhtakallio 2012, 13–16, 178–190) argue that industrial justifications are typical of 
Finnish politics. In this study, these different modes of justification will be coded from 
the data. For example, a candidate might justify an argument for the lowering of taxes 
by referring to the economy’s capability of organizing society through competition, 
constituting a market-world justification; or justify an argument for restricting immigra-
tion by referring to the need to uphold the purity of national traditions and culture, con-
stituting a domestic-world justification. 
3.3 Hypotheses 
My primary hypothesis is that in addition to European and domestic political develop-
ments; specificities of Finnish political culture, political history and the legacy of Fin-
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nish populism affect the views and justifications of PS candidates. More specifically, I 
hypothesize that we can discern two strains in the party: first, a rural, traditional and 
Finnish type of populism (Canovan 1999; Helander 1971; MacRae 1969; Minogue 1969; 
Taggart 2004; Wiles 1969), influenced by the legacy of the SMP; and second, a modern 
European radical right populist strain (Eatwell 2003; Hainsworth 2008; Mudde 2000, 
2004, 2007), fuelled by critical views on immigration and a new type of nationalism, 
more prevalent in cities. As noted previously (chapter 2.4), the PS’ economic policy is 
rather left-wing, as was the SMP’s. I expect to find more right-wing candidates in cities. 
The fact that the PS’ rural strongholds are the same that used to be SMP strongholds in 
the 1970s and 1980s seems to point in this direction. Many of the most prominent and 
visible anti-immigrant candidates have been in cities (Jussi Halla-aho, Juha Eerola), but 
there have been also rural ones (James Hirvisaari, Teuvo Hakkarainen). 
Traditional studies on populism (e.g. Helander 1971; MacRae 1969; Minogue 1969; 
Wiles 1969) have argued that populism is a rural phenomenon, where periphery rebels 
against the centres of elites, and even that the nostalgic “heartland” (Taggart 2004, 274) 
which populism harks back to is the “sacred farm” (MacRae 1969, 155), representing a 
consensual peasant community, an “agrarian gemeinschaft” (ibid., 156). The PS’ up-
surge, also, seems to have been most prominent in rural areas. However, the European 
populist radical right phenomenon, which I expect the urban PS to be a part of, is not 
rural in nature, and it does not seem that the urban PS would be very agrarian-nostalgic 
at all. Rather, I expect its nostalgia to be directed towards a pre-immigration, pre-
globalization, ethnically homogeneous Finnish nation-state. 
I have drafted a hypothetical table of the features of rural and urban populism in the PS, 
presented below. This is, of course, a simplifying and rough draft. Not all urban PS can-
didates are expected to be right-wing, for example, but right-wing policy is expected to 
be more prevalent and salient among urban PS candidates. Rural and urban PS populism 
should be understood rather as ideal types, expected to be more prevalent in the geo-
graphically corresponding candidate group than the other. 
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Table 1. Features of hypothetical ideal types of rural and urban PS populism 
It has been argued that arguments based on efficiency and a consensual political style 
are typical of Finnish politics in general (Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila 2011, 44–45; Lu-
htakallio 2012, 13–16, 178–190), explained by the strong connection between the Fin-
nish civil society and the state. These spheres were not opponents, but rather integral 
components in building the nation-state. Associations were integrated into the decision-
making system, thus creating political habits of rationally “taking care of common is-
sues” instead of groups fighting for their own interests, and these habits still show in the 
Finnish conception of citizenship. 
Should it be expected, thus, that the PS represents an opposite of pacific and rationalis-
tic Finnish political culture, because as a populist protest party, it is an opponent of con-
sensus and stagnation of mainstream parties? In Finnish populism, protest would mani-
fest as anti-consensual, antagonistic, emotional ways of doing politics with fierce de-
bates constructing stark polarizations. In this case, PS candidates should be expected to 
avoid the industrial-world justifications typical of Finnish politics. I do expect PS can-
didates to use these tactics to present themselves as an alternative to stagnation, but also 
 Rural Urban 
Economic policy Left-wing Right-wing 
Immigration Not especially salient Salient 
Type of populist ideology Finnish rural anti-elitist 
populism (SMP) (Canovan 
1999; Helander 1971; 
MacRae 1969; Minogue 
1969; Taggart 2004; Wiles 
1969) 
European radical right 
populism (Eatwell 2003; 
Hainsworth 2008; Mudde 
2000, 2004, 2007) 
Typical mode of 
justification (Boltanski & 
Thévenot 2006) 
Civic, domestic Market, domestic 
“Heartland” (Taggart 2004) The “sacred farm” (MacRae 
1969), pre-neoliberalist 
welfare state (March 2007) 
Pre-immigration, pre-
globalization, ethnically 
homogeneous Finnish 
nation-state 
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that the consensual and deliberative practices are so deeply ingrained in Finnish politics 
that even Finnish populists often play by these rules. After all, no party is “exclusively 
populist” (Taggart 2004, 270). These notions, I expect, apply to both rural and urban PS 
candidates. 
3.4 Data 
At least two particular requirements can be pointed out for adequate data to be used as 
material for analysis on a populist party. First, it should be representative of what is 
actually the focus of our study, in this case, the arguments and justifications the party 
presented before the 2011 parliamentary elections. Official policy papers such as elec-
toral manifestos only represent the official view of the party office, not necessarily the 
candidates’ or voters’ views. For example, the 2011 parliamentary elections manifesto 
of the Finns Party was 69 pages long and very broad and detailed (PS 2011). It would 
not be wise to assume that voter decisions were based on a thorough reading of that pa-
per. A suitable dataset for studying the party’s electoral success must include discursive 
acts closer to the voter, such as candidates’ published views. Second, if it is to represent 
the “supply” side available to voters (see Eatwell 2003), it should be unmediated. Using 
media data includes several problems. While mainstream media is an important political 
arena, and media representations matter, they can be and are accused of bias. This is 
especially true of populist parties that often criticize the media for elitism and anti-
populism. Thus, non-mediated data is more desirable for this study. 
A dataset that fulfils the requirements set above can be found in the Helsingin Sanomat 
Voting Advice Application (HS VAA) data. HS is Finland’s largest daily newspaper. In 
the run-up to the parliamentary elections of 2011, as in every major election since 2000, 
included on their website was a VAA designed to facilitate voters’ decisions by a multi-
ple-choice questionnaire of opinion on topical political issues. The candidates answer 
this questionnaire first and are also allowed to submit text comments attached to their 
answers. The voter then answers the same multiple-choice questionnaire and the VAA 
calculates a compatibility percentage with candidates, giving the voter a list of most and 
least suitable ones, and a possibility to view their comments on the different questions. 
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VAA’s have become very popular among voters in Finland during the 2000s, and while 
they are increasingly used elsewhere as well, Finland has an exceptionally long history 
of VAA use (Mykkänen 2011, 17). For the HS 2011 parliamentary elections application, 
candidates’ participation percentages ranged from 70% in the Pirkanmaa constituency to 
88% in the Helsinki constituency. 
The candidates’ selections as well as comments were released online by HS just before 
the election as open data to be freely downloaded, available for use by journalists, re-
searchers and ordinary citizens (HS 6 April 2011). Such initiatives are most welcome, 
and in the spirit of open-source software writing and open access publishing can pro-
duce new knowledge both in the developing field of data journalism and in the more 
established arena of the social sciences. This kind of data of political candidates is 
unique and was not previously available, and to my knowledge, is not available for any 
other country. Research on VAAs has so far focused on voters’ and candidates’ ways of 
using them, not the data produced by them (e.g. Haukio 2012; Jaakola 2012; Ruusuvirta 
2012; Vähämaa 2012). Collecting similar data as a survey would have been expensive 
and participation percentages would likely have been significantly lower. 
From the dataset, I picked the PS candidates’ comments to form the main data for this 
study. 202 PS candidates participated in the VAA with written comments, out of 238 
total PS candidates, making the response percentage of PS 2011 candidates 85%. Not all 
candidates wrote comments to all questions, and the amount of respondents is presented 
with the analysis of each question. 
In spite of the data being public and freely downloadable by anyone, including the 
names of candidates, I decided to remove names from direct quotes to avoid excessive 
focus on individuals. After all, the purpose of this research is to study rural and urban 
PS candidates as groups along with discourses that are always formed by several people, 
and the analyses are based on patterns in the data, contributed by several candidates. 
The identities of individual candidates quoted would not add to the analysis. Addition-
ally, some are not public figures in the sense that politicians are, and might even have 
retired from pursuing public positions after candidacy not resulting in election. In many 
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cases, the candidates are nevertheless identifiable, but this study does not make them 
any more so than the fact that the comments including names are already published 
online. In the case of the group of right-wing candidates around prominent immigration 
critic and parliamentarian Jussi Halla-aho, candidates are named, because due to the fact 
that this group of individuals differs significantly from the PS mainstream, identities are 
relevant for analysis. 
The questionnaire comprises of 31 questions that deal with a wide range of topical is-
sues in Finnish politics, covering taxation and redistribution of income, minority rights, 
immigration policy, nuclear power, NATO membership and cultural issues such as 
whether it is acceptable to sing Christian hymns in schools. Included as background 
information are the candidate’s name, constituency, province, age, gender, education, 
occupation, and a personal introduction by the candidate. The full questionnaire is pro-
vided in Appendix 1. 
Out of the 31 questions, I selected seven, dealing with three themes, to answer the re-
search questions and hypotheses. The first theme, discussed via an analysis of two ques-
tions, will be economic redistribution and social justice, because the PS’ left-leaning 
position on these issues has been a noted exception from other European contemporary 
populist parties, and also because according to my hypothesis, this is a theme where 
rural and urban candidates should differ. Secondly, addressed by two questions, I will 
analyse regional politics of respondents. This is another theme where I expect the ru-
ral/urban divide to show, and one where the SMP’s legacy should be visible. Finally, 
because issues of globalization, including immigration and European integration, have 
been identified as central for the PS and other contemporary populist parties, I analyse 
three questions on immigration and the Euro crisis as material for my third analysis 
topic. The responses to the analysed questions constitute a dataset of roughly 30 000 
words, or 200 double-spaced A4 sheets. 
The nature of the VAA questionnaire poses some limitations for analysis, however. The 
questions are very specific and have been formulated so that the respondent can choose 
one of the pre-selected options and does not have to give a free-text comment at all. 
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Because of this, the candidates’ responses are very short, often consisting of just one or 
a few sentences. This makes it difficult to conduct broad interpretive analyses, as would 
be typical of discourse analysis, for example. However, the data does lend itself rather 
well for content analysis with the coding scheme based on justifications theory, the 
method used here.  
Because of the brevity of the responses, I organized the data so that the answers by all 
respondents to one question constituted one document for analysis, rather than the re-
sponses to all questions by one candidate. This made it easier to familiarize with the 
particular discourse relevant to each question, reading the answers by all respondents to 
a question, and to focus on the most salient issues. Thus, the data was processed into 
seven text files which contain the answers by all respondents to each question. Each text 
file then represents a topical Finnish political discourse. This way, the data is organized 
as larger coherent wholes than if analysis would have been conducted one candidate at a 
time. 
I attached the respondents’ background variables to each answer and analysed the texts 
in Atlas.TI, a software package for qualitative analysis, which facilitates coding pas-
sages of textual data into classes and making searches based on the coding. 
After classifying arguments based on justification worlds and the framework on popu-
lism presented previously, I examine the rural/urban hypothesis by quantitative com-
parisons of found categorizations in rural and urban candidates. Presenting quantitative 
descriptions of qualitative categorizations can be methodologically problematic, be-
cause qualitative coding is an interpretive process by the researcher and the resulting 
classification is always, to some extent, subjective. Quantification should not be al-
lowed to blur this, and the reader should keep in mind that the percentages presented to 
compare the urban and rural groups are based on an interpretation. However, they do 
provide another layer describing the analysis, and even lend credibility to the qualitative 
coding if expected differences between urban and rural candidates are found. 
29 
 
The dataset only contained a very coarse indication of the candidates’ geographical lo-
cation (constituency/province), insufficient for my needs. Luckily, however, the mu-
nicipalities of residence for all candidates are made available online by the Ministry of 
Justice (2011). This information was added to the VAA dataset to make the rural vs. 
urban comparison possible. 
The division was made according to the classification of Finnish municipalities into 
rural ones, densely populated ones and urban ones, by Statistics Finland (2011a), based 
on population density5. 65% of the PS respondents were from urban municipalities, 18% 
from densely populated ones and 17% from rural ones, according to this classification. I 
decided that to simplify the analysis, the “densely populated” class would be combined 
with the “rural” group, to create a simple dichotomic urban/rural division. 
The “densely populated” category was combined with the “rural” group and not the 
“urban” one because it can only be described as “densely populated” in the Finnish con-
text, in a very sparsely populated country in general. To qualify as “densely populated”, 
a municipality only needs to have a population centre of 4 000 and 60% of the popula-
tion living in “concentrations” of at least 200. Thus, this category includes mostly small 
towns that can hardly be called “urban” on any internationally understandable scale and 
thus fit much better to the rural category. The categories and the municipalities included 
can be viewed online (Statistics Finland 2011a). 
                                                 
5 The criteria used by Statistics Finland are the following: “Urban municipalities include those in which at 
least 90% of the population lives in population centres [taajama] or the largest population centre has a 
population of at least 15 000.” “Densely populated municipalities include those in which at least 60% but 
less than 90% of the population lives in population centres and the largest population centre has a popula-
tion of at least 4 000 but less than 15 000.” “Rural municipalities include those in which less than 60% of 
the population lives in population centres and the largest population centre has a population of less than 
15 000, and municipalities in which at least 60% but less than 90% lives in population centres and the 
largest population centre has a population of less than 4 000.” (Statistics Finland 2010a.) Population 
centres [taajama], in turn, are defined as “concentrations of population of at least 200, where the distance 
of residential buildings is 200 meters at most” (Statistics Finland 2008). 
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Also, this re-grouping results in a category of 71 (35%) rural respondents and a category 
of 131 (65%) urban respondents, a more balanced division with enough respondents in 
both categories. The amount of respondents and response rate for each question is pre-
sented as a table in Appendix 2, along with tables of gender, educational level and age 
distributions of rural and urban respondents. It should be noted here, with regards to the 
analysis section of this study that is about to begin, that the rural candidates have lower 
educational levels and they are older as urban ones, as is true for the rural and urban 
general populations (Statistics Finland 2010b, 2011b). This should hypothetically mean 
more conservative views. Also, the rural group is even more male-dominated than the 
urban one. The gender distribution (66% male, 34% female) of total participating candi-
dates is very similar to the one of voters (67% male, 33% female) found by Suhonen 
(2011, 66). 
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4 Analysis I: Economic Redistribution and Social Justice 
This first analysis chapter will discuss questions of income equality, economic redistri-
bution and social justice by looking at Question 1 of the HS VAA on income equality 
and Question 4 on child benefits. A comparison of rural and urban candidates will fol-
low each analysis, and the chapter will end with conclusions on the nature of the PS’ 
left-wing populism. Issues of redistribution are, of course, among the most fundamental 
in politics, but were selected for analysis also because they have been argued to be fad-
ing out of everyday politics and making room for issues on cultural values and identity, 
especially for populist parties (Eatwell 2003, 52–56; Rydgren 2007, 246). As one of my 
main hypotheses, I expect this to be true of the urban part of PS, which I have hypothe-
sized to correspond to literature on the contemporary populist radical right, but for the 
rural candidates, I expect to find rather left-wing opinions infused with a rebellion 
against the wealthy elites of cities and underlining the plight of the rural poor, influ-
enced by the legacy of Finnish rural populism (SMP). 
4.1 Question 1: Income Equality 
Since the mid-1990’s, income inequality has increased rapidly. How would you re-
spond to this? 
The PS candidates’ responses to the first question, on income equality, were predomi-
nantly left-wing, justified by civic world arguments, and often by an anti-elitist and 
poverty-emphasizing populism. However, the candidates also often stressed preserving 
“societal peace” (yhteiskuntarauha), a justification combining civic and industrial 
worlds, in claiming that curbing inequality is not only good for the community but also 
an efficient way to ensure the functioning of the machinery of society. The following 
quote combines many of the common justifications found in the data in one response: 
32 
 
In our country, we have 900 000 people that are officially poor. Unofficially, even 
more. That’s too much. The people is being divided at an accelerating rate to those 
living on benefits and the top achievers [”huippumenestyjiin”], retiring at 60 with gold-
en handshakes and left to enjoy yearly pensions of hundreds of thousands of Euros. 
At the same time, demands are made to raise the general pension age. […] All the 
while the media is flooded with sad examples from African countries, where the 
people have taken to the streets for their rights. Finland will stay unified and com-
petitive only if we can stitch together the income inequality that is already 
concerningly dividing the people. (M, 49, Vimpeli, rural)6 
This respondent combined, in his claim for economic equality, the following justifica-
tions: societal justice (civic); appealing to poverty (civic); anti-elitism (civic); the dan-
ger of societal unrest (civic/industrial); economic competitiveness (domestic/market); 
and a threat to the unity of the people (domestic). These were the six major justifica-
tions used by the candidates in the debate on income equality in my data. Here, all of 
them were found presented by the same respondent. All of them were also used inde-
pendently and in different combinations by other respondents. 
Table 2. Codebook and respondents for Question 1 on income equality (%) 7 
                                                 
6 Translating the candidates’ responses was not always straightforward, as they contained concepts specif-
ic to Finnish politics, colloquialisms, grammatical errors and typing errors. I have attempted to retain the 
style of comments in the translations. 
7 Because I did not code all respondents into any of the identified categories, and on the other hand, coded 
others into several, the sum of percentages may be more or less than 100%. This is also true of subcatego-
ries: the sum of percentages of subcategories may differ from the percentage of the main category. 
Rural Urban Total 
Social justice (civic) 60 35 44 
      Poverty 31 23 26 
      Anti-elitism 25 13 17 
Societal peace (civic, industrial) 21 18 19 
Unity of the people (domestic) 10 9 10 
Economic competitiveness (domestic, market) 4 10 8 
(n) (48) (99) (147) 
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First of all, the argument for income equality was most commonly justified by referring 
to social justice. These candidates had the view that fairly equal incomes were in some 
sense socially “right”, and growing income cleavages were socially “wrong”. The ar-
gument was based on the civic order of worth, where justification is drawn from the 
good of the community. 
Increasing income inequality is unjust. Taxation must be used to level the differ-
ences, not to pile up wealth [”eroja on tasattava, ei kasattava”]. (M, 55, Siilinjärvi, rural) 
I found such appeals to social justice in almost all responses that were for increased 
economic redistribution. From this category, I separated arguments that justified income 
equality by reference to poverty and arguments that justified it by reference to the unjust 
wealth of elites. I interpreted these as populist justifications, invoking the civic order of 
worth; but in a more populist mode of justification than the general social justice argu-
ments, because they referenced caricatures of the extremes of the income scale, either 
the poor or the rich. 
Appealing to poverty was the more common of these. This was typically an emotional 
and provocative justification, an appeal to “the struggle of the underclass”: 
The objective must be that those living on minimum income can get out of misery 
up to an income level where they wouldn’t have to constantly ponder whether to 
take their medicine or eat. (M, 32, Helsinki, urban) 
The differences in income between the highest earners and the poorest, the ”true 
underclass” [“’suoranaisen kurjaliston’”], are huge. […] Income differences invoke des-
pair and pessimism in the poorest part of the people. […] the poor cannot afford 
anything but the most necessary of necessities. (F, 35, Veteli, rural) 
Some have money up to their necks [”rahaa kuin roskaa”] while others struggle from 
week to week in food handout queues. (M, 27, Kurikka, rural) 
These comments appeal to moral emotions and conjure images of a poor, struggling 
underclass, which is pictured as the polar opposite to a rich elite. Usually, these both 
ends of the socio-economic spectrum were mentioned to emphasize the contrast. How-
ever, I coded “poverty” and “anti-elitism” separately, because some respondents empha-
sized one and some the other, or used only one of these arguments. This was also evi-
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dent in coding later questions. The two arguments were often combined, but not always. 
I interpreted both as representing left-wing populism, because they emphasize extreme 
ends of the income scale and use simplified characterizations (such as “top achievers 
with golden handshakes” or “those living on benefits”) to construct the populist “elite vs. 
the people” narrative. 
The EU was also mentioned with reference to poverty and the “struggle of the under-
class”. It was depicted as the oppressor elite behind this injustice, so I interpreted it as a 
type of anti-elitism. 
The Finnish welfare state has collapsed and people are being humiliated in EU food 
handout queues and the benefits office. (M, 58, Rovaniemi, urban) 
Before the EU, income cleavages were small in Finland. The direction has been op-
posite since then. This development of the poor getting poorer must be stopped. As 
a result of the EU we have had new poverty that didn’t exist before. (M, 44, 
Nousiainen, rural) 
The anti-elitist respondents justified their income equality stance through a negation. 
The most pressing issue in these justifications was not necessarily poverty as is, or even 
societal injustice, but disproportionate wealth, acquired unjustly – the rich are unjustly 
rich and must be taxed more heavily or their incomes should be capped. These respon-
dents often used colourful language in describing the elites. 
Over-bloated pensions are to be banned, also golden handshakes and options. (M, 
67, Kankaanpää, rural) 
The ruptures of income and living standard cleavages must be stopped and the de-
velopment turned towards reducing inequality, starting from (because of the moral 
example) those greedy executives of big business, who hoard corrupt bonuses and 
gigantic pensions through their good ol’ boy networks, giving up their plunder of in-
justice [”suuryhtiöiden ahneet ökybonuksia ja jättieläkkeitä hyvä-veli-verkon avulla kahmivat 
johtajat joutuvat tinkimään epäoikeudenmukaisista saaliistaan”]. (M, 69, Kerava, urban) 
The phrase ”societal peace” was explicitly mentioned by many, and implied, by refer-
ence to increasing crime, unrest and other social problems, by even more. This created 
the fourth category of justifications I coded in response to this question. Many even 
mentioned preventing social unrest as the primary justification and did not mention so-
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cial justice at all. Most, however, saw the issue as one of social justice, but also having 
practical calculable consequences with regards to the functioning of society, in which 
case I interpreted the justification as one where the civic world and industrial world are 
used in compromise.  
If the current growth of income inequality continues, societal peace will crumble in 
the long run. (M, 57, Espoo, urban) 
For societal peace and justice this must be reacted to by e.g. taxation. (F, 63, Vantaa, 
urban) 
The notable increase in income inequality creates a base for societal unrest, crime 
and growing social problems. Curbing income inequality is the best pre-emptive so-
cial policy. (M, 37, Pyhtää, rural) 
This is noteworthy because such justifications are evident also in other questions: deal-
ing with the issue as one of social justice is avoided by relating to it as a rational issue 
that can be evaluated by its expected positive or negative effects, its worth measured in 
industrial terms. These respondents saw the issue as one of choosing the rationally best 
option that will lead to “unity of the people” and “stability of the society”. These are, of 
course, moral values also, but the choice is made with reference to considerations of 
effects instead of arguments on “what is right for the community”. 
One interpretation is that this is a typical justification in Finnish politics, where justifi-
cations based on the industrial order of worth are the norm (Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila 
2011, 44–45). Another one is that because many PS candidates are relatively inexperi-
enced politicians, industrial justifications are seen by them as more convincing on polit-
ical arenas than “gut-feeling” arguments. 
National economic competitiveness, on the other hand, is an example of a justification 
in which the market world and the domestic world of justification are combined in 
compromise (Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila 2011, 42). I included it in the fifth justification 
category for this question and interpreted it as a nationalist variant of market liberalism. 
It was, perhaps unexpectedly, used as justification for both increasing and decreasing 
economic redistribution, exemplified by these two quotes: 
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The current large differences in incomes eats competitiveness, and can even threat-
en societal peace in the long run. (M, 61, Karkkila, rural) 
Finland can prosper only through work. Earnings of those who work must conse-
quently rise, in relation to people living on social benefit. (M, 41, Helsinki, urban) 
The other variant of justifications coded in this category, in addition to those emphasiz-
ing Finland’s national competitiveness, was that of economic competition on an indi-
vidual level. This argument held that income differences are good, because they spur 
competition and reward achievers. This is a typical market-world justification. It must 
be noted that it is not necessarily an egoistic one, where only those who succeed would 
matter, but competition was seen as leading to better things for all, a common good in 
itself, a measure of worth. I interpreted these justifications based on competitiveness, 
either as a nation or individuals, as right-wing economic liberalism. 
I don’t see differences in incomes as a signal of injustice as such. The problem is not 
that some earn plenty, but that in lower income classes working doesn’t pay off be-
cause of taxation and because of free income redistribution funded by taxes. Work-
ing should always and in all circumstances be profitable. I believe it is good that a 
person can get wealthy by honest work, at least in theory. This should not be pre-
vented by unduly hard taxation. (M, 39, Helsinki, urban) 
People make a big fuss about growing income cleavages for no reason. What’s rele-
vant is taking care that there’s no poverty, be the highest income class as high as it 
may. (M, 33, Espoo, urban) 
Having only small differences in income are no value in itself. More important is 
how those who earn least get along on an absolute scale. An ideal society offers 
equal opportunities for everyone. From there on, success in society is up to the in-
dividual. (M, 30, Helsinki, urban) 
It was notable how wide-ranging the opinions of income distribution were on a left–
right scale. It has been noted before that the PS seems to be predominantly a left-wing 
party with regards to its economic policy, but also that the range of opinions is wider 
than in traditional, mainstream parties (see e.g. Grönlund & Westinen 2012, 171; Borg 
2012c, 198–199). This was also clearly visible in my analysis.  
The sixth and final justification in the income equality question was that of inequality as 
a threat to the unity of the Finnish people. I interpreted this as a traditional nationalist 
37 
 
argument, one that could perhaps be interpreted as left-wing economic policy, because 
of its emphasis on economic equality, but on the other hand as right-wing because of its 
nationalism. This serves as an example of the problems of interpreting the candidates’ 
political positioning on such simplistic scales as “left–right”. In terms of justification 
worlds, this argument can be interpreted as a domestic world justification, but if nation-
alism is invoked in exclusionary and chauvinistic terms, interpretation is more complex, 
which is why I will return to nationalist justification later. 
Social justice strengthens the nation unit [”Sosiaalinen oikeudenmukaisuus rakentaa kan-
sakokonaisuutta”]. I am not in favor of development towards a flat income tax rate, 
which makes the rich richer but the poor poorer. Narrowing income gaps is also in 
the interest of the wealthy in the long run. Society exists to facilitate a life of dignity 
for everyone. (M, 40, Nurmijärvi, urban) 
All in all, the respondents were mostly in favour of economic redistribution and using 
taxation to level income cleavages, justified by reference to civic worth. Some defended 
this position by simply referring to “social justice”, while many combined this with in-
dustrial-world arguments on equality leading to a better functioning of the mechanisms 
of society. The more populist strain emphasized either the distress of the poor or the 
injustice that the elite are “filthy rich”. However, I also identified a notable right-wing 
economic liberalist strain, appealing to the market world. These candidates felt that in-
come differences are necessary to boost competition, increase incentives to work and 
make Finland as a nation competitive on global markets. Related to this was the thesis 
put forward by some that equal income dispersion strengthens the nation, which of 
course leads to the opposite policies, even though the justification is similar. 
Moving on to comparing the rural and urban candidates, the anti-elitism described 
above figured more prominently in the rural group and was found in 25% of the rural 
respondents of this question but only 12% of urban respondents. With the poverty ar-
gument, the difference was not as clear-cut, but still there:  the justification was used by 
31% of rural respondents and 23% of urban ones. Arguments interpreted as populist 
seem thus to be more common among rural respondents. 
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Reading the rural and urban responses that I identified as anti-elitist side by side, it was 
evident that both made references to social justice. The existence of the high-earning 
elite was seen as unjust and unfair. These references to justice did not differ between the 
rural and urban groups. Some of the respondents presented more rationalizing and cal-
culative formulations of this argument: the consequences of growing elites were empha-
sized, for example with reference to the growing bitterness of the people leading to so-
cietal unrest, or large relative income gaps leading to poor educational achievement for 
the less well off: 
In Finland, income inequality has grown fastest out of all OECD countries, which 
describes the current state of Finnish politics [”nykyistä politiikan tahtotilaa”], every-
thing for the rich, little or nothing for the less well off, entrepreneurs and the poor. 
Income gaps are not in anyone’s interest, it increases the feeling of inequality, de-
creases consumption, and in the long run increases criminality and insecurity. Curb-
ing income inequality lessens costs arising from marginalization and detrimental fac-
tors affecting lives such as mental well-being [sic, ”ihmisen elämään haitallisesti 
vaikuttavia tekijöitä kuten henkistä hyvinvointia”]. (M, 44, Vantaa, urban) 
Here, justification theory helps to differentiate these claims from simple left-wing social 
justice arguments. While typical social justice arguments employ only civic justifica-
tions, these “rationalizing” arguments made a compromise between the civic and the 
industrial worlds. My hypothetical model led me to expect that I would find more such 
calculative conceptions of justice in the urban set. Such a difference could, however, not 
be discerned from the data. 
With regards to my hypotheses, the results so far are inconclusive. On the one hand, the 
anti-elitist component of populism was found, as expected, more among the rural candi-
dates. On the other hand, however, there was no difference in rationalizing of arguments, 
as one would expect. 
What was most striking, however, was that all of the 12 identified right-wing liberal 
responses in the income equality question, invoking the market world, were by male 
candidates, and 10 of the 12 were urban. One of the most visible anti-immigration poli-
ticians in the party, Jussi Halla-aho, was one of them. It is sometimes argued that Halla-
aho is the frontman of a right-wing, mostly urban, mostly male populist radical right 
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“bloc” in the party (e.g. SK 18.4.2011), which corresponds to my hypothesis of the dif-
ference between the rural and urban PS. This analysis seems to preliminarily confirm 
that estimate. The argumentation of this group seems to differ from the mainline PS. It 
is not the whole truth about the urban PS, however, neither according to my analytical 
model nor this preliminary result. 
A vast majority of both rural and urban PS candidates expressed left-wing opinions, but 
the rural ones notably more often with populist justifications such as anti-elitism and 
appealing to poverty. The occurrences of right-wing opinions, advocating economic 
freedom, competition and individual responsibility, rather than taxation, redistribution 
and a strong welfare state, were put forward by the aforementioned urban male candi-
dates. This supports my hypothetical model of left-wing populism being more typical 
for the rural PS and a modern (radical) right-wing populism for the urban, but with a 
crucial correction: the radical right populists seem to be a minority even within the ur-
ban PS.  
4.2 Question 4: Child Benefit 
Question 4, on child benefits, raised a similar discussion among the PS respondents than 
Question 1, on income equality, and a lively one at that. The discussion focused on eco-
nomic redistribution and socio-economic strata, a classical left–right setting. 
Child benefit is paid for each child living in Finland up to the age of 17 regardless of 
the parents’ income. What should be done with child benefits? 
Table 3. Codebook and respondents for Question 4 on child benefits (%) 
Rural Urban Total 
Anti-elitism 50 28 36 
Poverty (civic) 40 23 29 
Welfare state (civic) 19 29 26 
Fertility for nationalism (domestic) 10 4 6 
Right-wing liberalism (market) 5 4 
(n) (48) (92) (140) 
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I coded responses into five categories. The first category, the most frequent type of ar-
gument, was put forward by those who advocated significantly cutting or abolishing 
child benefits for the rich in an anti-elitist argument typical of left-wing populism. The 
argument can be summarized as “the rich already have too much”. 
Child benefits are for living expenses during childhood, not for investment capital. 
(M, 68, Kärsämäki, rural) 
For the child’s advantage the money has to be used for growth and development. 
Child benefits from the filthy rich [”ökyrikkailta”] to preventing of child poverty. (F, 
Ähtäri, rural) 
Child benefit for high earners can be removed, because they have enough wealth for 
the upbringing of their children. (M, 56, Joensuu, urban) 
I separated these justifications, emphasizing that the rich are getting too much, from the 
second category, which consists of those who stated that the poor and needy are getting 
too little, similarly to the analysis of Question 1, discussed previously. Both represent a 
typical left-wing populist argument. I coded them separately because some emphasized 
the anti-elitist argument that the rich are getting too rich, whereas some emphasized the 
plight of the poor. Many combined these, in which case I coded the quotations in both 
categories.  
Many of the comments that I coded into the second category, those who appealed to 
poverty, opposed the practice that child benefit is treated as income when needs-testing 
for another state benefit, basic income support. In these cases, receiving child benefit 
can have a negative impact on basic income support. This practice was seen by the can-
didates as deeply unjust and contributing to the distress of the poorest. The following 
are examples of the “poverty” justification: 
Child benefit for a poor person’s child is used for clothes, shoes and general living 
expenses. Child benefit for a rich person’s child can be saved to gain interest and 
wait for a time when the child needs money for education, for example. This is ex-
actly how riches are transferred from generation to generation. Poor children have 
to take out loans for their studies and start their post-graduation lives already im-
prisoned by debt [”velkavankeudessa”] and often also unemployed. NOT RIGHT! (F, 
60, Orimattila, rural) 
41 
 
This is exactly one of the issues where it’s measured if Finland is a welfare state or 
not…should children suffer of lack in single-parent and unemployed families? Hu-
manity is required of decision-makers. (F, 63, Lappeenranta, urban) 
Whereas such arguments emphasizing social justice would typically be interpreted as 
civic justification, in some cases, especially in anti-elitist arguments, the left-wing 
populist justifications transcended the civic order of worth in excluding the elites from 
their conception of common good. The right to child benefits was to be denied from the 
elite, so the “pure people” of populism could continue to enjoy it, as was right and just. 
Here, the elite were excluded from the people, and functioned as its constitutive outside 
(Laclau 2005a). Thus, in this argument, the step was made out of the grammar of public 
justification where worth is measured publicly, into a world of conflicting interests that 
could not be evaluated by reference to a common measure of worth. The limits of justi-
fication will be further discussed later. 
The third category, in contrast, consisted of left-wing but not populist arguments. These 
invoked the civic world of justification. There were some who argued that child benefits 
are for everyone, a universal benefit to be provided by society in the same amount to all 
families with children. This is a typical pro-welfare-state argument, consistent with the 
Nordic social-democratic model of universal instead of needs-tested benefits. On the 
other hand, some believed that there should be an income progression to child benefits, 
so that they would be larger for the poor, and smaller for those who earn more, to curb 
income inequality and strengthen economic redistribution. Both were, however, inter-
preted as representing a left-wing social democratic non-populist stance, with a minor 
difference in whether benefits should be paid universally in the same amount or pro-
gressively according to income. I coded them in the same category because both stances 
had the same civic justification of social welfare and levelling of socioeconomic cleav-
ages. The conception of “the people” in these arguments was inclusive rather than ex-
clusive, in contrast to the previously discussed anti-elitist arguments. 
In some cases it was a matter of interpretation whether a comment should be coded into 
one of the first two categories of left-populist arguments or the third category of more 
moderate social-democratic style arguments emphasizing income equality. I interpreted 
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justifications as populist when they referenced either the distress of the poor or the 
riches of the wealthy specifically, and as social-democratic when they suggested the 
need for income equality without making specific reference to these characteristic ex-
tremes of wealth distribution. Some of these candidates also argued that it would be 
wrong to deny high earners of child benefit because they have contributed to it via taxa-
tion. This was an argument that firmly planted a response in the social-democratic non-
populist category, arguing by reference to civic worth, because it differed dramatically 
from populist anti-elitists, who sought exclusion of the elites from the people. The fol-
lowing are examples of social-democratic civic justifications: 
Child benefit is for the child. It is a benefit that must not be cut. Cuts for high earn-
ers are ethically wrong in my opinion. After all, they contribute to the running of 
this system by tax revenue. […] What is a high income anyway? 5000e? They already 
pay most of everything. Kindergarten fees in full, for example. (F, 43, Espoo, urban) 
Child benefit is a permanent value and is not measured in envy [”Lapsilisä on pysyvä 
arvo, eikä sitä mitata kateudella”]. (M, 57, Pudasjärvi, rural) 
The fourth category in the child benefit discussion was one of nationalism. These re-
spondents argued that child benefits should exist to boost Finnish fertility. I interpreted 
this as an argument of classical nationalism, equating the nation with its capacity for 
reproduction, based on domestic justification. 
Child benefit is a reward for rearing children, given to every mother. […] Finland 
Needs Finns (M, 67, Loppi, rural) 
Child benefit is a societal comment for children, domestic production, that is. (M, 
37, Pyhtää, rural) 
Finland needs children, children need child benefit. (M, 61, Kittilä, rural) 
The fifth and final category found in the child benefit discussion was one of anti-
redistribution. This included those who were against focusing benefits for those who 
need them financially because that would reduce their propensity for work, and those 
who were against child benefits in general for the same reason. This is a classical right-
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wing liberalist argument emphasizing individuals’ responsibility for their own liveli-
hood, based on the market order of worth. 
If child benefits were to be progressive according to parents’ income, an increased 
salary would not mean an increase in real income, because child benefit would ac-
cordingly decrease. This would lead to a welfare trap, where additional work would 
not be rewarded. (M, 39, Helsinki, rural) 
The general picture painted by a thorough reading of PS candidates’ views on child 
benefits was one of strong support for the welfare state and economic redistribution. 
While some infused nationalistic elements for Finnish fertility in their comments, child 
benefit was mostly seen as a welfare tool to alleviate economic inequality. The justifica-
tions for this position, however, differed. While many candidates presented fairly mod-
erate arguments for societal justice via income-progressive or universal benefits, even 
larger were the groups where this position was justified by a strong disapproval of the 
“filthy rich” or pleas to consider the distress of the poor, “suffering children” that need-
ed “clothes and shoes”. In these arguments, the good of the elites could not be combined 
with the good of the people, which the candidates claimed to represent. These are typi-
cal populist justifications, constructing the people by excluding the elite, and indicate 
strong grounds to view these PS candidates as left-wing populists. This is a type of pop-
ulism advocated already by the SMP in the 1970s with their eyes on the rural poor suf-
fering from the consequences of economic and industrial modernization and urbaniza-
tion. However, I also found right-wing liberalist justifications in support for cutting 
child benefit to increase incentives for paid work, based on the market order, though in 
much lesser numbers. 
I then applied the division to rural and urban candidates to the analysis. Firstly, anti-
elitism (“child benefits for the rich should be cut”) was revealed to be more prevalent in 
the rural group than the urban one. I classified 47% of rural respondents to this question 
as anti-elitist left-populist, whereas the percentage for urban respondents was 28%. This 
was also found in the second left-wing populist category, that of appealing to the plight 
of the poor. This argument was used by 37% of rural respondents and 23% of urban 
ones. This corroborates my hypothesis that a left-wing type of populism is more typical 
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of the rural wing of the PS than the urban one, which would, again, be more of a right-
wing nature. 
However, with the third category, that of supporting child benefit by non-populist, civic 
world arguments favoring income redistribution typical of social democracy, this bal-
ance is shifted. I coded 29% of urban respondents to this category, and 18% of the rural 
ones. This would suggest that a redistributive, moderate, social democratic left-wing 
position, rather than right-wing economic liberalism, is rather typical of urban respond-
ents to this question. 
The fourth category of argument, supporting child benefits in a nationalistic bid to boost 
Finnish fertility, was fairly rare, and fairly evenly distributed among the rural/urban 
divide. 
The fifth one, consisting of market-world right-wing arguments about redistribution 
decreasing incentives to work, was rare as well, found in only five responses. However, 
it is noteworthy that all five were urban candidates, and four of them were men in their 
30s. Three of them were the same three that had similar right-wing liberalist justifica-
tions in the previously analysed question regarding income inequality. 
In these discussions, regarding economic equality and redistribution, these candidates 
form a team of urban right-wing economic liberalists. They have also been rather visible 
in the media, giving a face to this group of PS politicians; representing precisely the 
type of PS argumentation I have hypothesized to be typical of the urban PS. However, 
they form a very small faction of PS candidates in my data. Even in the urban group, 
they are a very small minority. It cannot be said that the urban candidates would be very 
right-wing as a group. On the contrary, they carry mostly left-wing opinions in these 
questions of economic redistribution, just like rural candidates. The difference is that 
the rural group relies more on simplified characters of “the rich” and “the poor”, appeal-
ing emotionally, and even excluding the rich from the people to which common worth is 
applicable. The urban candidates in my data seem to be more mainstream and more 
moderate, basing their argumentation on the civic world of public justification. To some 
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extent, this might be explained by the lower educational levels of the rural candidates. 
The rural candidates may be less politically experienced, as well. All in all, in the in-
come equality and the child benefit question, both rural and urban candidates seem to be 
strongly for the welfare state, but the rural ones argue for it in a more populist fashion. 
A right-wing “bloc” was pinpointed in the urban data. However, this “bloc” was isolat-
ed, and the mainstream of the urban candidates was far from right-wing. 
March (2007, 67) argues that for contemporary European left-populists, the mythical 
“heartland”  their nostalgic ideology harks back to is a pre-neoliberalist welfare state of 
roughly 20 years ago. This seems to be an accurate description of PS candidates in both 
rural and urban areas, constituting the majority of respondents. They point to increasing 
income inequality and poverty, which is blamed on the EU and financial elites, and 
want to reverse this development. This type of populist argument is even more typical 
of rural than urban PS candidates. In the cities, there is a right-wing bloc, but it consti-
tutes only a minority of the urban PS. Both rural and urban candidates mostly see grow-
ing income inequality as a threat. Fears of the collapse of the welfare state under eco-
nomic pressure signal a strong commitment to social welfare ideals. 
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5 Analysis II: Regionalism 
Regional politics should be one of the key areas for analysis, given a hypothesis of an 
urban/rural divide within the PS. If my hypothesis of the rural PS being more attached 
to their SMP rural populist roots than the urban PS holds, they should be expected to 
favour strong regional policy and municipal democracy, opposed to a state-centric sys-
tem potentially controlled by the urban elite. Urban parts of the party, however, are not 
expected to put much stress on this. Grönlund & Westinen’s survey research (2012, 174) 
found that PS voters emphasized regional politics less than all the other parties, except 
for the Greens, which runs contrary to my hypothesis, but with some doubt about the 
reliability of their indicator. My results indicate that for the candidates, regional politics 
is an issue of major salience. 
Questions 27–30 of the questionnaire discussed regional and municipal politics, and out 
of them, I selected questions 28 and 30 for analysis, dealing with the structure of the 
municipal administration system in Finland and distributing tax revenues across mu-
nicipalities. Rural and urban candidates will again be compared at the end of analysis of 
each question. 
5.1 Question 28: Consolidating Municipal Administrations 
The amount of municipalities has been reduced by consolidation to 336. The aim is 
efficiency in administration, as many small municipalities are struggling to cope with 
producing the legally required services. What would be the right amount of munici-
palities? 
The background for the first question selected for analysing regional politics is govern-
ment policy that attempts to reduce the amount of municipal administrations for effi-
ciency reasons. This is to be done by mergers (kuntaliitokset) of existing municipalities. 
Municipal administrations have to provide certain services to their population, such as 
health care, emergency services and police, legally required by the state. To fund these 
services, municipalities raise municipal tax, but also receive state subsidies. Providing 
these services in sparsely populated municipalities is expensive, which is why the state 
has taken up a policy strongly advocating the consolidation of peripheral municipalities, 
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for purposes of efficiency through larger administrative units. In some cases, the state 
can force the municipalities to merge, even if the local administration disagrees. 
The overwhelming majority of respondents were strongly opposed to “forced” consoli-
dations (pakkoliitokset) of municipalities by the state, and this was the most common 
theme discussed in responses, even though the question was not explicitly about state 
involvement. However, some respondents did voice explicit support for the state active-
ly reducing the amount of municipalities. Since the respondents were so clearly divided 
between two positions, and both sides used similar justifications, I coded the responses 
to this question first to those opposed to and those defending state-led consolidation and 
present justifications separately for these two sides. 
Table 4. Codebook and respondents for Question 28 on municipal administrations (%) 
The most commonly used justification by respondents opposed to state-led consolida-
tion of municipalities was a civic-world regionalist argument demanding regional de-
mocracy, independence and local services. 
The decision making power must be kept with the inhabitants of the region. The 
current system must be demolished. Funding for legally required services must come 
from the state treasury instead of municipal tax. Who creates the law must pay for it. 
This would mean equal treatment for the whole population. (F, 53, Helsinki, urban) 
  Rural Urban Total 
Opposed to state-led consolidation 80 68 73 
      Regional democracy and services (civic) 20 32 27 
      Economic efficiency (industrial) 18 22 20 
      Anti-elitism 8 7 8 
      Local way of life (domestic) 4 2 
For state-led consolidation 14 12 13 
      Regional democracy and services (civic) 
      Economic efficiency (industrial) 6 3 4 
      Anti-elitism 
      Local way of life (domestic) 3 2 
(n) (49) (69) (118) 
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The amount of municipal administrations is not an end in itself, instead how they 
manage economically and socially, produce local welfare for their residence and fur-
ther democracy. (M, 44, Vantaa, urban) 
Industrial world justifications were the second most common, and were notably used 
both for and against consolidations. Those who were opposed to state-led mergers ar-
gued that they do not actually lead to the savings the defenders of the practice based 
their argument on. Examples of both follow. 
I have heard a saying ”by cutting overlap we free people for productive work”. Until 
this day I have not seen what overlap has been cut and how people have been freed 
for productive work. I don’t believe in these fairytales [“En usko tällaisiin satuihin”]. 
Forced consolidations MUST NOT BE DONE! If municipal administrations merge 
voluntarily, that’s their business, but not by forcing consolidations. (M, 49, Vimpeli, 
rural) 
It is clear that administrative costs are reduced by enlarging units. This means larger 
municipalities, optimum roughly 30 000 – 50 000 inhabitants. (M, 65, Pieksämäki, 
rural) 
The third category of justification was that of anti-elitism. These respondents saw that 
consolidations only benefited elites. Specifically, it was often mentioned that public 
servants employed by municipalities enjoy a five-year notice, which means that they 
cannot be laid off in five years despite possible redundancies due to municipalities 
merging. This anti-elitist argument was often combined with an industrial justification. 
The five-year notice was blamed for consolidations not leading to savings. 
The amount of municipalities should not be cut because bureaucracy employees 
cannot be cut due to mergers. Has the purpose of municipality administration con-
solidation been to secure jobs for public servants for five years at a time. (M, 54, 
Utajärvi, rural) 
A fourth and final justification I found in the data was one of protecting local values and 
customs of a municipality. It emphasized that municipalities are not just administrative 
regions, but homes to their inhabitants, with local cultures. This is a typical domestic 
argument, denouncing industrial worth from the realm of local tradition. 
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The way of life and values of residents must also be taken into account, a municipal-
ity is not a production unit, but a home [”kunta ei ole tuotantoyksikkö, vaan koti”]. Eve-
rything cannot be measured in money. (M, 37, Pyhtää, rural) 
This justification was used by only two rural candidates opposing consolidations, but 
notably also two urban candidates defending them. Those candidates mentioned local 
cultures as something that must be taken into account in consolidations to preserve them, 
even though consolidations were necessary on economic grounds. 
In merging municipalities, however, we must take into account the municipalities’ 
own traditions, however, such as names etc. The significance of traditions must not 
be underestimated in consolidations. (M, 41, Helsinki, urban) 
What is most noteworthy here, however, is the strong dominance of civic and industrial 
arguments over domestic ones. This is in contrast to the domestic nationalist responses 
of candidates for questions of globalization, analysed in what follows. Whereas nation-
alism was justified – as we will see in analysing the next theme – with tradition; region-
alism was instead justified with efficiency. Even those who opposed municipal consoli-
dations on grounds of regional independence very often did so with industrial world 
arguments appealing to efficiency, the same ones typically used by those who defended 
them, stating that savings cannot really be achieved by merging municipalities. In other 
words, the opponents of mergers accepted the logic of efficiency as the basis of measur-
ing worth, but argued that the measuring had not been conducted properly. Also, with 
regards to Grönlund & Westinen’s (2012, 174) results of regional politics having little 
relevance for PS voters, the discrepancy with my findings of the PS candidates’ strong 
opposition of consolidating municipalities needs to be noted. This opposition was justi-
fied based on regional independence, local democracy and the upkeep of local services 
even in peripheral areas. I found 73% of respondents to this question to be opposed to 
the state merging municipalities. Perhaps there is a division between the urban and rural 
candidates in this issue? This will be discussed next. 
I coded 80% of rural respondents and 68% of urban respondents as opposing state-led 
municipal consolidation, and 14% of rural and 12% of urban respondents in favour of it. 
This does not seem like a significant difference between the two groups. Neither can 
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one be seen in justifications for these positions. The noteworthy difference seems to be 
that 32% of urban candidates presented civic-world justifications of regional independ-
ence, democracy and services, compared to just 20% of rural ones. This seems peculiar, 
perhaps, but it might be simply because many rural candidates presented no justifica-
tions at all, merely stating “no to forced consolidation”. This, of course, reveals the 
limitations of the data, with many responses being rather short and blunt. 
No to forced consolidation!!! (F, 47, Mäntsälä, rural) 
No to forced consolidation! (M, 59, Nousiainen, rural) 
No forced consolidations! (F, 63, Äänekoski, rural) 
To conclude, there seems to be strong support for regionalism and significant opposition 
to the state being active in merging municipalities, on the grounds of local independ-
ence, democracy and services, both among rural and urban PS candidates. This might be 
explained by conservatism and traditionalism, wanting to uphold traditions and cultures 
not only on the national level but the regional as well. However, specific mention of 
local values, customs and cultures was surprisingly rare. Instead, arguments were also 
often justified by referring to the industrial order of worth, arguing that claimed savings 
cannot actually be achieved via mergers, something typical of Finnish politics (e.g. 
Luhtakallio 2012, 13–16, 178–190), and something that seems to be typical of Finnish 
populism as well. 
5.2 Question 30: Regional Levelling of Tax Revenue 
Question 30 was about the state redistributing tax revenues to less wealthy regions. I 
expected the rural/urban divide to be very visible in answers to this question. 
The state redistributes tax revenue so that money is distributed from the wealthy 
municipalities to the less well-off ones. This system guarantees a tax revenue level 
for every municipality that equals 91.86% of the average tax revenue of Finnish mu-
nicipalities. The biggest net payers are Helsinki and Espoo, which pay roughly 500 
million of their municipality tax revenue to be transferred to less well-off munici-
palities. How would you respond to this? 
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The low response rate to this question likely has to do with its lengthy and complicated 
formulation, and the fact that it was the second-to-last question in the rather long ques-
tionnaire. 
Table 5. Codebook and respondents for Question 30 on municipal tax redistribution (%) 
I coded the responses into three main categories: Those who were for redistribution of 
tax revenue from wealthy urban municipalities to poorer rural ones (pro-periphery), 
those who were against this system (pro-Helsinki) and those who emphasized unity and 
avoidance of any rural vs. urban antagonism on the matter. 
I further differentiated from the pro-periphery respondents three particular justifications 
for this argument. First, there were those who stressed the unjust accumulation of 
wealth and population in the Helsinki region in an anti-elitist argument typical of rural 
populism. Second, some emphasized “rural values” such as peace “away from the hurry 
and noise of cities”, in an argument that I interpreted as infusing domestic and inspired 
orders of worth. After all, the “peace of the countryside” was considered by these can-
didates as an external source of worth that cannot be attained by any other means. It 
could, also, be interpreted as engaging with a familiar commonplace which escapes pub-
lic justification – I will come back to this. Finally, a group of candidates underlined ef-
ficiency in an industrial-world justification. 
Rural Urban Total 
Pro-periphery 74 52 60 
      Anti-Helsinki (anti-elitism) 44 20 28 
      Rural values (domestic, inspiration) 6 2 3 
      Efficiency (industrial) 6 2 
Pro-Helsinki 16 11 
      Anti-rural (market) 10 6 
"No antagonism"   7 4 
(n) (34) (61) (95) 
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Out of the pro-Helsinki category, against municipal tax redistribution, I differentiated 
specifically anti-rural responses, those who blamed the rural municipalities for their 
own poverty, a market justification. 
To describe these categories, firstly, some of the respondents that I coded in the pro-
periphery category were not coded into any of the specific subclasses, but instead left in 
the general category. These respondents generally based their argument on a civic-world 
moral justification of fairness. It was seen as right for the more wealthy municipalities 
to pay “their share” for the less affluent ones. Also, many candidates cited a wish to 
“keep the whole of Finland inhabited”, fighting fears of deserted countryside villages 
with no population or services left after people have moved to the cities. 
The only possibility for poor municipalities to produce all of the services required 
by law is the system of redistributing tax revenues. […] Factors contributing to the 
bad situation of municipalities include the age structure of the population, economic 
structure and distances, not bad economic choices. A living countryside is also for 
the benefit of whole Finland. (F, 63, Äänekoski, rural) 
TAKING CARE OF REGIONAL POLITICS HAS BEEN VERY SLACK. 
CONCENTRATIONS OF POPULATION HAVE BEEN ALLOWED ESPE-
CIALLY IN THE CAPITAL REGION. SO REGIONAL INCOME STRUC-
TURE DISTORTIONS HAVE HAD TO BE LEVELED. (M, 36, Nokia, urban) 
A subcategory of the moral defence of the redistribution system was an anti-elitist one, 
underlining the injustice of the accumulation of wealth in the capital region of the coun-
try. 
The capital region is a concentration that benefits from the whole of Finland. Thus 
tax revenue must be redirected from there to areas out of which the capital region 
has sucked the blood out of, so to speak. (M, 44, Turku, urban) 
The municipalities of the capital region get so much indirect ”location benefits” due 
to their status from different sources and different functions, which due to the na-
ture of the matter stack up here, that they can afford a system like the one we have 
now. (M, 69, Kerava, urban) 
There were also a few industrial justifications stressing that it is efficient to level the 
development of municipalities country-wide by this sort of redistribution. Also, some 
respondents cited values of the countryside as a reason to keep it lively. 
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The countryside needs to be kept inhabited at any means necessary. A human being 
has to have a place to go to relax and cool off in peace [”päästä rauhoittumaan”], away 
from the hurry and noise of the cities [“pois kaupunkien kiireeltä ja melulta”]. (M, 62, 
Polvijärvi, rural) 
Arguments defending the Helsinki region, in contrast, were more straightforward, with 
less variance in justifications. They were mostly made by candidates from the Helsinki 
region who simply saw no fair reason for giving up Helsinki taxpayers’ money to fund 
poorer rural regions. 
There are many problems in Espoo as well, for example, that should be tackled. I 
don’t see any sense in the biggest cities having to function as the biggest payers, 
when funding isn’t sufficient even for their own needs. (F, 32, Espoo, urban) 
However, some did use quite strong wordings in their opposition to rural municipalities 
receiving these tax redistribution payments, typically stating that the system should 
function according to the rules of the market. Examples of passages I interpreted as an 
anti-rural attitude included: 
500 million or a thousand euros per Helsinki resident is a tough price to pay for a 
reindeer herder from Ranua being able to go to the pub on public transport [”kova 
hinta maksettavaksi siitä, että ranualainen poromies voi käydä baarissa julkisilla 
kulkuneuvoilla”]. Finland was transformed after the wars from an agrarian society in-
to an industrial one, and gradually from an industrial society into a postmodern so-
ciety with open offices and a service economy [”postmoderniksi avokonttori- ja 
palveluelinkeinoyhteiskunnaksi”]. We must not fight the inevitable historical develop-
ment by keeping the most uninhabitable regions inhabited by force. (M, 30, Helsinki, 
urban) 
The levelling system is unjust especially for the capital region. Helsinki takes in the 
most immigrants and because of the levelling system hundreds of millions are 
poured to other municipalities. The levelling system should be fixed to be fairer and 
municipalities in trouble should be encouraged to be self-sufficient. Municipalities in 
constant decline should be supported by other means. (M, 24, Tampere, urban) 
These responses run counter to a traditional interpretation of populism as a protest of 
rural periphery against elitist centres (e.g. MacRae 1969), and to the left-wing populist 
mainstream of the party. These respondents saw the concentration of wealth into urban 
centres in the south of Finland as natural and just. Worth was measured by these candi-
dates on a market-world scale. All of these respondents were from urban municipalities. 
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Not all urban candidates, however, were against the redistribution system, even if the 
most radical opponents were all urban. In fact, I coded 52% of urban candidates as “pro-
periphery”, and 20% even “anti-Helsinki”. All of the rural respondents were in favour 
of the system or even demanded increasing the redistribution. 
This led me to question the specific implementation of the rural/urban division of data. 
Often, the “urban” candidates in favour of supporting rural municipalities were not from 
the Helsinki region, but smaller cities, and perhaps identified themselves more as repre-
sentatives of rural than urban Finland. The divide in respondents to this question is ac-
tually more of a “greater Helsinki region vs. the rest of the country” division. However, 
for other questions such a division would most probably have been unbalanced. 
Additionally, the division seen within the urban group is again noteworthy. The six re-
sponses I coded as anti-rural, that is, strongly opposed to redistribution of taxes to 
poorer municipalities, all turned out to be by male candidates, all but one in their 20s or 
30s, already noted in analyses of other questions as market liberalists. Again, it seems 
that the division between rural and urban PS is not that significant, but within the urban 
group, there is a segment that differs from the rest of the candidates. In analyses of ear-
lier questions, it has been noted that this segment is more right-wing in economic policy, 
using market-world justifications, and in what follows, it will be noted as more strongly 
opposed to immigration, justifying their position on industrial-world claims. In this 
question as well, the opposition to municipal tax redistribution can be interpreted as a 
right-wing liberal position, but what also needs to be noted is its strong opposition to 
rural populism. In addition, the responses invoked market-world justifications in their 
appeal to let the municipalities manage themselves and fall if not capable of doing so. 
All in all, PS candidates were mostly strongly in favour of supporting the economic and 
administrative independence of peripheral rural municipalities, and the issue was quite 
salient, a result that contradicts Grönlund & Westinen’s findings (2012, 174). The ad-
ministrative independence of municipalities was defended with industrial justifications, 
arguing that no significant savings would be achieved by consolidations, in a manner 
typical to Finnish politics (Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila 2011, 44–45) whereas supporting 
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their economies was defended on grounds of populist anti-elitism. In their comments, 
these respondents placed the corrupt elite in the capital region. However, there were 
candidates who were strongly against financial support for peripheral municipalities, 
and this position was often justified by referring to justice measured on the marketplace. 
These candidates represent a stark contrast to the rural pro-periphery populism of the 
majority of PS candidates. 
It should be noted that justifications referencing the unjust position of elites, placing 
worth in the purity and wisdom of the “ordinary” people, typical for populism according 
to many scholars (e.g. Laclau 2005a, 2005b; Mudde 2006; Taggart 2004), seem typical 
of the PS. This anti-elitist populism was in many issues identified as more typical of 
rural candidates. Such a justification was placed in my analysis within the civic order of 
worth, grounded in the worth of the collective and its general will. However, in its op-
position to the elite, it has exclusion in its very core. This is why I have coded it as anti-
elitism in all of the questions, instead of plainly as civic justification. For example, let 
us reflect back to the question on child benefits. The matter of whether benefits should 
be extended to all citizens universally, or just the impoverished people, differentiated 
social-democratic respondents from anti-elitist-populist ones. I will return to a discus-
sion on nationalist populism later. 
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6 Analysis III: Globalization 
Because issues of globalization have been identified as central for the PS and other con-
temporary populist parties, I selected three questions on immigration and the Euro crisis 
as material for the final analysis topic. The first question is about immigration policy, 
the second about the tradition of singing a Christian hymn in schools in springtime, and 
the third about the Euro crisis. A comparison of rural and urban candidates is included 
with the analysis of each question, and after analysing these three questions, a chapter 
reflecting on nationalist justification follows. 
It is hypothesized that the candidates will have conservative nationalist views on these 
issues, but cultural issues related to immigration are expected to be more salient for ur-
ban respondents than rural ones. Urban respondents are expected to back their argu-
ments with justifications of cultural incompatibility and economic efficiency, based on 
domestic and industrial orders of worth, whereas rural respondents are hypothesized to 
present justifications more grounded on classical nationalism, stressing the domestic 
order of worth. 
6.1 Question 25: Immigration 
During the parliamentary term 2007–2011, immigration policy was tightened by sev-
eral separate decisions. Do you feel that Finland’s current immigration policy is too 
strict, agreeable, or too slack? 
I first coded the PS candidates’ answers to the immigration question thematically to see 
which themes related to immigration they found most salient. Then, I coded justifica-
tions for these arguments, and finally, compared rural and urban candidates. 
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Table 6. Codebook and respondents for Question 25 on immigration (%) 
The most often mentioned themes in the immigration answers were, in order of fre-
quency, family unification policy (perheenyhdistämiset), work-related immigration 
(työperäinen maahanmuutto) and immigrant criminality. Out of these, family unifica-
tion policy was discussed in a negative voice while work-related immigration was ac-
cepted and immigrant criminality presented as a threat. 
Family unification, a policy which permits and funds immigration to Finland for family 
members of already accepted immigrants, was unequivocally criticized by the PS candi-
dates for promoting much too slack immigration policy. The opinions ranged from argu-
ing that the criteria for family unification procedures should be tightened up to arguing 
the practice should be ended altogether. A common cause for concern was the spending: 
Family unifications have exploded. 5000 to 6000 applications are waiting in the im-
migration bureau. Finland is the only country in the world that flies family members 
to Finland – with taxpayer money. (M, 24, Tampere, urban) 
“Work-related immigration” was cited very often, in a somewhat approving light, most-
ly as contrast to “welfare refugees” (elintasopakolaiset), those who are accused of seek-
ing refugee status “only” for a better standard of living, not because of actual distress. 
The importance of work in the immigration issue was notable. The question of who 
should be allowed to come was very strongly connected to whether they were “coming 
for work”, and even then, Finns should be given a chance for those jobs first. 
Rural Urban Total 
Themes       
      Family unification policy 10 20 17 
      Work-related immigration 20 12 15 
      Immigrant criminals 17 6 10 
Justifications 
      Efficiency (industrial) 15 20 19 
      Finns first (domestic) 10 7 8 
      Cultural incompatibility (domestic, industrial) 10 4 6 
(n) (41) (83) (124) 
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Immigration policy is not simple, instead it should be divided into work-related im-
migration and refugee policy. Work-related immigration is acceptable as far as there 
are no Finns to do that work […] Refugee policy, on the other hand, has totally 
failed, bringing welfare refugees into our country. (M, 42, Ulvila, rural) 
Crime committed by immigrants was a prevalent topic. Explicitly racist arguments 
about immigrants being criminals were rare. Most commonly, it was argued that immi-
grants found guilty of crimes should be deported. The frequency of this argument in the 
data does suggest a presumption among many candidates that immigrant criminality is 
common and needs to be dealt with. 
Criminals need to be rejected already at the border. We don’t need criminal asylum 
seekers in Finland. (F, Rovaniemi, urban) 
In one answer, the fear of criminal immigrants was combined with welfare chauvinism 
(Kitschelt 1995; Mudde 2000) so that even Finnish prisons were seen as a resource of 
the welfare state not to be abused by non-native Finns: 
We have to get foreigners convicted of serious or repeated crimes out of our coun-
try. If they sit their sentence in a Finnish prison, they unnecessarily burden the pris-
on institution. Finnish prisons are meant mainly for Finnish prisoners. (M, 45, 
Rääkkylä, rural) 
After a thematic glance, I coded the responses for justifications. The most common ones 
were an industrial-world, calculative, “rational” take on immigration; a domestic-world 
“Finns first” justification; and a “cultural incompatibility” justification, which blended 
domestic and industrial justification in arguing that best results would be achieved by 
keeping cultures apart. Here, I will address the industrial justification for immigration. I 
will return to “Finns first” nationalism and the “cultural incompatibility” argument in 
chapter 6.4, discussing nationalist justification. 
An industrial justification for immigration arguments was put forward by a number of 
candidates. Here, the candidates argued that the immigration issue was to be solved ra-
tionally, calculating its positive and negative effects. Most argued that this calculation 
should be made from the viewpoint of Finland and its national interest, a combination of 
industrial and domestic orders of worth, but some also used this argument to support 
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developmental aid instead of immigration, to “help them where they are, where the help 
is more efficient” instead of “bringing them here”, referencing efficiency of help rather 
than the Finnish interest. In any case, in most of the answers, immigration was viewed 
as an issue where positive, negative and neutral effects should be evaluated and calcu-
lated and decisions made on the basis of this calculation, instead of current, misguided 
policy, which was often referred to as “Finland functioning as the social office for the 
world”. This referred to Finland acting emotionally or morally in a much too altruistic 
manner to help the needy of foreign countries while leaving its own nationals in poverty. 
Finland needs to be open to immigration that is neutral or beneficial in quality. We 
need to be strict when effects are negative, which Finland unfortunately hasn’t done. 
Bad immigration is not a force of nature, but a political choice. Finland cannot be 
the social office for the whole world, because that would wreck those facets of the 
Finnish welfare state even ordinary immigrants appreciate. I am for an opportunistic 
immigration policy, beneficial to Finland, of which for example Canada can serve as 
an example. I would employ a citizenship test, a language test and a scoring system. 
As we demand more, we must also offer more – language training must be clearly 
improved. […] We should favor groups that integrate better according to experience. 
(M, 24, Espoo, urban) 
The policy must be strict regarding the kind of immigration that has negative effects 
on Finnish society. Finland cannot afford nor does it have the duty to function as a 
global social office. Instead, Finland must be open to immigration that has neutral 
or positive consequences. (M, 33, Espoo, urban) 
This industrial justification for immigration policy was discussed especially in the con-
text of “work-related” immigration, which was seen as positive for Finland (as long as 
Finns did not want the jobs) and contrasted with refugee policy, which was portrayed as 
“negative” and “failed”. The view that these decisions were to be made with Finnish 
interest in mind was either explicated or taken for granted, making the “work-related 
immigration” argument a combination of domestic and industrial orders of worth. Vir-
tually no mention of refugee policy as humanitarian help of war-stricken and distressed 
refugees was made. It seems almost that to the respondents, refugee policy had no hu-
man-rights dimension, only a dimension of economic efficiency, either (firstly) for Fin-
land or (secondly) the country of origin of the refugee. It could be argued that all “work-
related immigration” arguments are ones based on the industrial order of worth. How-
ever, I only included those that specifically referred to calculable effects or efficiency. 
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Proceeding to compare rural and urban respondents to this question, 63% of urban re-
spondents and 58% of rural ones commented on it. The slightly lower response rate 
among rural candidates might indicate support for my hypothesis of immigration issues 
being more salient for the urban PS, but the difference is small. 
I expected to see anti-immigration industrial justifications consistent with radical right 
populism from the urban candidates, and this was indeed the case. 20% of urban candi-
dates presented industrial justifications to the immigration issue, compared to 14% of 
rural candidates. On the other hand, while the previously located arguments about “im-
migrant criminals” were found in both urban and rural respondents, 17% of rural re-
spondents used them, compared to only 7% of urban ones. 
Crime has increased because of foreigners [”ulkolaisten”, translates also as outsiders] 
getting into the country too easily. (M, 62, Polvijärvi, rural) 
The “immigrants as criminals” argument, found in the rural PS candidates, can be seen 
as a simplifying “they are a threat to us” argument typical of populism, whereas the ra-
tionalistic, calculative take on immigration is typical of the new radical right, emphasiz-
ing the economic cost of immigration or the incompatibility of cultures. This supports 
my hypothesis of the geographical divide of the PS into rural populism, characterized 
by simplified “us vs. them” dichotomies, and urban radical right populism, more calcu-
lative and rationalistic in nature. 
Immigration policy must be rationalized! [”Maahanmuuttopolitiikkaa on järkeistettävä!”] 
Finland must prioritize caring for Finns. […] After everything has been done to fur-
ther that cause, we must next attempt to employ immigrants already staying here. 
Only then can we take new immigrants. Even then, we must make sure that those 
who come have the basic requirements to cope here. This can be arranged by assur-
ing sufficient Finnish skills already in the departure country […] The costs of this 
kind of rationalized immigration policy would be notably lower than now. (M, 47, 
Vantaa, urban) 
On the whole, the PS candidates justified their critical opinions on immigration policy 
mostly with industrial–domestic arguments based on calculating negative and positive 
influences of immigration for Finland. While the immigrants’ position was rarely men-
tioned, when it was, it was typically argued that they can be better helped in their home 
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country, again a justification of efficiency. Urban candidates used these industrial justi-
fications more often than rural ones, who in contrast presented more emotional national-
ist arguments. Immigration issues were salient for both, however, unlike hypothesized. 
6.2 Question 24: Suvivirsi 
Question 24 was directly related to the immigration debate and was, to an extent, 
straightforward to analyse because of the candidates’ unanimous view on the issue. All 
respondents defended Finnish tradition in their comments but with different justifica-
tions. I will describe these justifications below, followed by a comparison of rural and 
urban candidates. 
Should Suvivirsi be sung at schools’ spring festivities? 
Suvivirsi (“Summer hymn”) is a spring-themed hymn traditionally sung by pupils in 
Finnish schools’ spring festivities (kevätjuhla), ending the semester and marking the 
beginning of the summer holiday season. Because its lyrics are Christian in content, it 
has been argued that it is not suitable for a secular event such as a school spring festival, 
and that singing a Christian hymn is offensive to students of other religions. Some 
schools have opted to remove the hymn from their festivity programmes or to arrange 
an alternative event for students of other faiths. Critics of multiculturalism have taken 
up these measures as an example of an undesired “giving up of national traditions” as a 
concession to immigrants. Despite being considered by some as a quintessentially Fin-
nish tradition, the hymn is of Swedish origin. 
Table 7. Codebook and respondents for Question 24 on Suvivirsi (%) 
Rural Urban Total 
National tradition (domestic) 51 82 71 
Individual rights (civic, domestic) 29 17 21 
(n) (35) (60) (95) 
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The PS candidates unanimously argued that Suvivirsi is an important part of Finnish 
tradition and its position as part of spring festivities should be upheld regardless of its 
religious content. It has been sung for decades and is something that is a part of Fin-
nishness, they argued. Many thought that the hymn’s Christian content is irrelevant, and 
singing it is not practicing religion. Many even said, in a domestic-world justification, 
that they are not Christians themselves, but value the tradition that the singing of the 
hymn constitutes. 
Finland’s future is built on traditions and the achievements of our nation. Traditions 
are beautiful and patriotic. (M, 61, Vantaa, urban) 
Finnish traditions are part of our culture, which we should respect, not be ashamed 
of. Teaching in schools is not denominational teaching of religion. (M, 57, Helsinki, 
urban) 
There are things that belong so strongly to tradition, that their abolishment does not 
create equality, but something quite else. I, for one, am not a religious zealot 
[”Minäkään en hihhuloinnista perusta”], but suvivirsi does not have anything to do with 
that in my opinion. (M, 44, Turku, urban) 
However, there was a variant of this argument combining the domestic justification with 
a civic justification of equal rights. These comments stated that the tradition must be 
upheld, but those of a non-Christian faith do not have to observe it. 
I doubt they keep guard in spring festivals who’s singing and who’s not. (M, 41, 
Vihti, rural) 
Non-Christians are to be exempt from the event. They can have their own event af-
ter the singing of Suvivirsi. That’s equality. (F, 54, Muurame, rural) 
No-one has to sing a religious hymn, but Finnish traditions must be upheld. (M, 30, 
Honkajoki, rural) 
This argument combining domestic and civic world justifications of “we’ll keep to our 
traditions but you are free to not observe them” often teetered on the edge of a racist 
argument, however. On the one hand, it emphasized equal rights to traditions and relig-
ion, but when stated in a provocative “if you don’t like it, get out of here” fashion, it 
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was clear that the respondent did not really want to emphasize his support of equality, 
rather his critical view of immigrants. 
If Finnish traditions are a problem for an immigrant, the immigrant can move else-
where.  (M, 39, Helsinki, urban) 
A few responses were overtly discriminatory, such as ones claiming that having to see 
Muslim traditional dress was in some way a painful experience, that all Muslims subor-
dinate women or implying that Muslims are somehow inclined to “hurt animals or chil-
dren” in their traditions. 
If Finns have to look at the religious dress of muslims and the subordination of 
women under the guise of religion, so we can without worry sing suvivirsi once a 
year! IS THIS QUESTION SOME SORT OF JOKE??? (F, 53, Helsinki, urban) 
Sure, you don’t have to sing the hymn if you don’t want to, or you feel like it doesn’t 
fit with your culture. We mustn’t give up our traditions because of immigrants. 
Aren’t Finns offended by being prohibited of observing your own traditions in your 
homeland? When in Rome, do as the Romans do, and suvivirsi has been sung in 
schools in springtime for a long time. And must be sung in future. They can have 
their own festivities in madrasahs as long as they don’t hurt animals or children. (F, 
46, Kajaani, urban) 
All in all, PS candidates felt very strongly about defending this particular Finnish tradi-
tion, mostly basing their argument on a domestic world justification of national tradition 
but also a justification combining domestic and civic world justifications in emphasiz-
ing tradition on the one hand but freedom of religion on the other. 
Comparing urban and rural candidates, the urban response rate for this question was 46% 
and the rural 49%. The low numbers are likely explained to some extent by the fact that 
this question was number 24, since response rates seem to drop towards the end of the 
questionnaire. There is no significant difference between the rural and urban rate, de-
spite my expectation that this issue, representing a cultural question related to immigra-
tion, would be more salient for urban candidates. In fact, the small difference in the re-
sponse rate is in the opposite direction. Looking at the rural/urban division of the cate-
gories coded above, it should be noted that rural candidates used the “individual rights” 
argument combining civic and domestic justification much more often (29%) than urban 
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ones (17%), whereas urban respondents overwhelmingly (82%, as opposed to 51% of 
rural candidates) justified their stance on a simple domestic “national tradition” argu-
ment. I hypothesized that rural candidates would be more inclined to use civic world 
justifications and urban ones would be more anti-immigrant in the vein of the contem-
porary European radical populist right, and these results fit the hypothesis rather well. 
In conclusion, the candidates felt very strongly that national traditions such as Suvivirsi 
are important in themselves and should be defended. Urban candidates took a tougher 
line on this, while rural candidates based their opinion more often on an argument of 
individual rights. However, on the basis of this data it was often difficult to interpret 
when a respondent was underlining rights to freedom of religion and when the argument 
was actually intended as an aggressive “if you don’t like it, get out of here” line. 
6.3 Question 10: The Euro Crisis 
With the other Euro countries, Finland has taken part in bailing out countries in cri-
sis by hundreds of billions of Euros. In the spring 2010, Finland agreed to lend 1,6 
billion Euros to Greece. Additionally, Finland promised to back up the 750 billion 
loan standby package of the European stability mechanism by over 8 billion Euros, 
if needed. Finland may still have to increase the amount of its loan securities. What 
are your views on this? 
The final question to be analysed, Question 10, was about one of the most discussed 
election themes, one that is still very topical, the Euro crisis. Unsurprisingly, the PS 
candidates were strongly against the Euro bailouts. I found no responses in favour of the 
economic support packages. Justifications for this position, however, were varied. 
While some underlined that the economy should be let function undisturbed by its own 
rules, others focused on the moral right- and wrongdoers of the situation. Some found 
the crisis countries themselves were to blame, some saw the fault was of the bankers or 
the EU itself. 
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Table 8. Codebook and respondents for Question 10 on Euro bailouts (%) 
The most common argument was one of moral disapproval of the crisis countries, con-
demning them as irresponsible and underlining the formidable economic policy of 
North European countries. Examples of such an argument, stressing the difference be-
tween Finland and the crisis countries, include the following: 
Supporting the Greek crisis is truly a mistake, because they themselves had driven 
the country’s economy into that state. It would be easier to understand, if it would 
be because of for example an eruption of Mount Etna, the reason we’re helping, but 
it’s not. Especially now that they want more time for a payment that has barely been 
received, does not give a very reliable picture of willingness to repay. (F, Lempäälä, 
urban) 
Even though we have joined the monetary union, which was a mistake in itself, it 
does not oblige us to support countries that have recklessly gotten into debt. It’s like 
giving a drink to a drunkard to cure his hangover [”kuin antaisi juopolle krapularyypyn 
helpottamaan oloa”]. Soon more booze (read: money) will be needed anyway to make it 
better again. (M, 58, Sipoo, rural) 
Pouring free cash out of the purses of our taxpayers to fraudster countries 
[”huijarimaille”] (Greece) and countries that have dealt with their own issues badly 
(Ireland, Portugal etc.) is unfathomable stupidity. Finland rose out of the recession 
of the early 1990’s by its own, even though it did hurt. No greeces etc. shoveled 
money at us. (M, 69, Kerava, urban) 
In the arguments including praise of the economic conduct of Northern countries, fol-
lowing the rules of a market economy was seen as a moral value in itself, typical of a 
market world justification. This was often combined with nationalist pride of the Fin-
nish economy, constituting a combination of market and domestic justifications. 
Irresponsibly have countries with weak economies been taken into the monetary un-
ion. If only Northern European countries, with model economies, would have been 
included, this kind of bubble wouldn’t have appeared quickly. (F, 49, Järvenpää, ur-
ban) 
Rural Urban Total 
Anti-South (domestic, market) 17 26 23 
Anti-elitism (civic) 14 15 15 
Market liberalism (market) 5 15 12 
(n) (42) (84) (126) 
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Germany, Holland, Scandinavia and the Baltic countries would be a sufficiently 
sized economic community. We would have all the benefits of a common currency, 
but would not have to suffer from the negligence of countries that deal with things 
badly. The culture of economic discipline is common around the Baltic Sea area. 
The currency could be called the mark [markka]. (M, 36, Kotka, urban) 
Several candidates even referenced the Finnish Winter War as an example of Finnish 
resilience at times of hardship, citing the Finns’ ability to recover from the war “without 
outside help” and requiring similar efforts from countries facing economic crisis today. 
Finland handled its war debts and immigrants from karjala by itself. (M, 55, Mikkeli, 
urban) 
The blame was not always placed in the crisis countries themselves, however. Some 
highlighted the responsibility of banks and bankers, some even specifically noting that 
the citizens of the crisis countries are not the ones to blame. Examples of the anti-elitist 
argument blaming banks or bankers include the following: 
Here we are again supporting porker banks and their henchmen 
[”syöttöporsaspankkeja ja niiden takapiruja”]. Cannot go on like this. (M, 56, Salo, urban) 
Now we saved the banks and the citizens in these countries, too, suffer. These 
countries should have tightened the belt a long time ago even though it might have 
felt miserable but maybe we would have avoided ending up where we are now. (M, 
45, Turku, urban) 
Arguments that underlined the markets’ ability to heal themselves if they are not inter-
fered with were also found, such as here: 
Bailout package policy is not just ethically wrong, it is also bad economic policy. We 
cannot socialize bankers’ losses to taxpayers. Greece should have been let go bank-
rupt, which it eventually will anyway. Finland should under no circumstances in-
crease its amount of economic promises. (M, 24, Espoo, urban) 
To summarize, a strong attempt at building a frontier between the “honest” Finns with 
“economic discipline” and an Other was typical of the PS candidates’ responses to the 
Euro crisis. This Other was sometimes portrayed as the “dishonest” and “lying” Greeks 
and other nationalities of the affected countries, sometimes as “greedy bankers”. At the 
same time, the moral integrity of Finns, along with other Northern Europeans was un-
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derlined. Many, however, did not deal blame, but rather demanded leaving the market 
alone to fix its own illnesses. 
In comparing urban and rural candidates’ responses to this question, I found no signifi-
cant differences in the anti-banker anti-elitist argument, which I coded in 15% of urban 
responses and 14% of rural responses. A more notable difference was seen in the argu-
ment blaming the crisis countries, which I coded in 26% of urban responses and 17% of 
rural responses. However, I found the market-world argument on the economy healing 
itself in 15% of urban and only 5% of rural responses. Again, there seems to be a right-
wing economic liberal bloc within the urban PS. Taking a closer look at the 13 identi-
fied urban candidates with market-world justifications, we again find Jussi Halla-aho, a 
well-known right-wing MP, together with 11 other men. Barely any women are found in 
this group.  
In total, the PS candidates had strong views on the Euro crisis issue. Having Northern 
countries bail out weaker economies of the South was seen as morally reprehensible, 
and the respondents believed the Southern countries or bankers should be held respon-
sible for their own failures. However, the condemnation of the crisis countries them-
selves was more prevalent in cities. Also, out of those respondents who believed the 
crisis countries and banks should be allowed to go bankrupt and the market be left to fix 
things on its own, a large majority was urban. 
6.4 On Nationalist Populism 
Analysing the three questions on globalization, above, has shown that the PS candidates 
use nationalist arguments in defending selective immigration policy, Finnish tradition 
and economic sovereignty. Domestic justifications were often used in conjunction with 
industrial and market justifications, when candidates argued that efficiency for Finnish 
interest should be the basis of policy. Nationalism has many facets, however. The can-
didates used a variety of different ways of invoking nationalism, and in this chapter, I 
will discuss them via Thévenot’s (2007, 2011a, 2011b) sociology of engagements. 
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A typical argument in the data was the cultural incompatibility argument, based on a 
presumption that some cultures simply should not be mixed, and that we would all be 
better off living in separate, homogenous culture spheres: 
Finland is too easy to get into. Immigration should be limited, so that only those 
with the same type culture can get to finland, so these problems would not arise. (F, 
40, Kuusamo, rural) 
A similar argument asserted that even if non-Finns should be excluded from rights 
guaranteed for Finns, they should be entitled to certain rights based on their own nation-
ality or ethnicity. This was evident, for example, in some of the PS candidates’ claims 
that developmental aid should be opposed because we are all better off when each coun-
try takes care of its own citizens.  
Internationality is unquestionably a good thing and mustn’t be confused with glori-
fication of multiculturalism. “When in Rome, do as the Romans do” [“’maassa maan 
tavalla’”] is an excellent expression. I myself think it means that an immigrant must 
adopt Finnish practices and, above all, Finnish law. Everyone has a right to exercise 
their own religion, as long as it doesn’t require the input of the Finnish taxpayer, and 
doesn’t affect Finnish traditions e.g. in schools. (F, 30, Tuusula, urban) 
In these cases, the candidates acted within the regime of public justification and based 
their justifications on the domestic order of worth. This worth was seen as universal. In 
this type of justification, other nationalities are expected to have their own hierarchies 
based on tradition and ancestry. This is pluralist “identitarianist” nationalism, acknowl-
edging other nationalisms (Betz & Johnson 2004, 316–320). Membership in a nation is 
seen as a common good, justified via tradition and ancestry, and to be respected by all 
nations in their own way. Despite wishing to exclude foreigners from the Finnish nation, 
respondents believed they should be included in the traditions and benefits of their re-
spective nations. These respondents raised the argument of nationalism onto a higher 
level of generality than that of Finnish nationalism, onto the level of valuing a plurality 
of nationalisms, which was used as a public justification. 
Personal interests and ties are excluded from public justifications. The seven orders of 
worth in the grammar of public justification are, after all, “different kinds of common 
good” (Boltanski & Thévenot 1999, 365, my emphasis), which means that they are uni-
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versal: appealing to them includes a conception that the other party can appreciate worth 
on the same measure. Not all engagements include such a conception, however. Also 
typical in the data was a “Finns first” argument, which implies that Finns should come 
before other nationalities or ethnicities. Here, a common and universal good is not ref-
erenced and instead the respondent sees his or her claim as one of national interest equal 
to the interests of other nations, to be compromised upon instead of agreed upon. This 
was often seen in responses discussing work-related immigration, such as here: 
Immigration should not be allowed as long as Finns are unemployed. First we em-
ploy the Finns and only then others. (F, 67, Rovaniemi, urban) 
Work-related immigration is acceptable, as long as we take into account unemployed 
Finns. (M, 63, Espoo, urban) 
Rather than being a public justification based on universal domestic worth, such an ar-
gument sees Finns as a group with a legitimate interest that it plans to further, compet-
ing against other groups (nationalities, in this case) with equivalent competitive interests. 
It does not raise nationalism to the level of generality of a universal value, to stress a 
plurality of nationalisms. Instead, it stresses the Finnish interest. In such an argument, 
reaching an agreement by justifying based on common measures of worth is not the 
goal. Here, the candidates invoked a grammar of liberal individuals (Thévenot 2011a, 
12–14).  
Within the grammar of liberal individuals, disputes are of an interest-politics kind. Indi-
viduals (or in this case, nations) are seen as pursuing their own interests, and disputes 
are settled not by agreeing on a common good, but by creating compositions (Thévenot 
2011a, 9–10), which can, for the purposes of this research, be simplified as compro-
mises between the different interests. Each party of the dispute receives an appeasement 
of their interests, but the dispute is not agreed upon by agreeing on common worth. In-
stead, within the liberal grammar, interests are equal in worth, and every individual has 
an equal right to further their interest. 
Another way of grasping these grammars is that they correspond to “regimes of en-
gagement” (Thévenot 2007, 409), or “ways in which that which is exterior to the human 
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being is treated: the objects around them, the environment” (Wagner 1999, 348). They 
are “states of being human” (ibid.), “or, in Anglo-American terminology, […] forms of 
‘agency’” (ibid.), or “cognitive formats” (Thévenot 2007, 409). Each state of being hu-
man, or regime of engagement, corresponds to a particular grammar, that is, mode of 
communication. 
I expected most candidates to act within the regime of public justification, as parliamen-
tary politics typically demands its participants to argue with public justifications on a 
general level instead of personal engagements. This demand is also typical of Finnish 
politics, even on a non-parliamentary, grassroots level, as found by Lonkila (2011) and 
Luhtakallio (2012). This is why I based my coding scheme in my analysis on public 
justifications. As shown above, however, some candidates operated on a lower level of 
generality in their arguments, with a grammar of liberal individuals. Furthermore, some 
did not raise the level of generality of their argument even to the level of the grammar 
of liberal individuals, and instead engaged on a grammar of personal affinities. 
The grammar of personal affinities relies on personal relationships that are excluded 
from disputes within the grammar of justification and the grammar of liberal individuals. 
In the grammar of personal affinities, communication relies on personal ties to com-
monplaces, which can be literally physical places or, more abstractly, common, shared 
areas of cultural meaning. (Thévenot 2011a, 14.) When referring to commonplaces of 
the regime of familiar engagements, respondents do not raise the level of generality to 
the regime of public justification (Thévenot 2007, 415). Commonplaces need no justifi-
cation. They cannot be grasped through a grammar of justification, nor via a liberal 
grammar of equivalent competing interests, because the good they maintain is that of 
feeling at ease, at home, comfortable (Thévenot 2011b, 49). Cultural artefacts, such as 
the Suvivirsi in my data, are shared commonplaces. This is evident in the candidates’ 
relationship to them: when discussing them, the “limits of justification” (Thévenot 
2011a) are crossed and arguments can no longer be justified on a public level, and are 
instead related to in a very personal manner. In fact, these commonplaces were never 
related to within a regime of justification, as their generality cannot be sufficiently 
raised. The relationship to such commonplaces is a personal engagement. The candi-
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dates quoted below clearly do not attempt to engage in a public justification over Su-
vivirsi, but instead feel it is something of their own that has been insulted, which is why 
it provokes such an emotional response. 
If Finns have to look at the religious dress of muslims and the subordination of 
women under the guise of religion, so we can without worry sing suvivirsi once a 
year! IS THIS QUESTION SOME SORT OF JOKE??? (F, 53, Helsinki, urban) 
Totally unbelievable that someone would even question this. (M, 57, Espoo, urban) 
Give me a break!! [“No huh huh!!”] (M, 45, Kouvola, urban) 
Lonkila (2011, 31) asks whether the typical Finnish way of requiring all political argu-
ments to operate on such a level of generality that arguments are publicly justified has 
led to neglecting some research questions and themes. This is indeed a relevant question, 
not only for research, but for politics as well. The remarks presented in this chapter 
about PS candidates engaging within a regime of personal affinities lead us to question 
whether the differences in the level of generality hinder meaningful political debate. 
Because the generally accepted way of doing politics is one of raising the argument onto 
a level of generality where its worth can be publicly assessed, arguments that instead 
base themselves on personal ties and commonplaces are not accepted. This is one way 
in which the gap between the PS and mainstream Finnish politics can be interpreted, 
and highlights why fruitful communication across this gap is so difficult. For example, 
the PS itself embraces the label of “populism”, attaching itself to localized “heartlands” 
(Taggart 2004), which are, in essence, commonplaces of local tradition. Mainstream 
politicians condemn this for being old-fashioned and demagogic, because in their view, 
politics should be conducted with publicly justifiable measures of worth, which the 
“heartlands” of populism as familiar commonplaces clearly are not. This is a conflict 
between regimes of engagement, between levels of generality. The PS have a different 
way of engaging in politics than mainstream parties, making it easy for mainstream par-
ties to condemn the PS for using a grammar “not suitable for serious politics”, whereas 
PS candidates see mainstream politics as difficult to understand and operating on a level 
of generality that is too high, escaping familiarity. 
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7 Conclusions 
More often than not, politicians and social scientists will argue that the era we are living 
in is an era of change. Politicians argue so because promises of redemption at times of 
crisis or stagnation help them gain votes, and social scientists because it lends credence 
to their analyses. I, too, have claimed that the PS’ rise is symptomatic of the end of an 
era of consensus in Finnish politics, because I argue that studying this perceived change 
can be useful. After all, PS politicians have argued that a change is upon us and needs to 
be responded to. Voters, also, seem to have understood this, considering election results. 
However, there is a tendency to try to understand change by attaching labels to things. 
While labels, or categories, are invaluable tools that help us in analysing the world, rely-
ing on them too much can narrow our field of vision. This is why I believe it is not suf-
ficient to study a political change by attaching a label such as “rural populism”, “radical 
right populism” or “left-populism” to it. While I cannot escape using such labels alto-
gether, what I can do is attempt to go deeper than that, to analyse the processes behind 
the phenomena marked by these labels. 
The public and politicians, after all, use these labels too, to make sense of a complex 
world. While scholars attach a label of “populism” to political movements that under-
line the righteousness of the general will of the people against the corrupt elites, these 
political movements use labels such as “the rich”, “the culturally incompatible”, “the 
distressed poor”, “the fraudster countries” or “the greedy bankers” to categorize their 
political environment. Labels generalize a world of infinite possibilities into categories 
that are easier to process. What I hope this research has achieved is to shed some light 
into how and why the PS candidates used the labels they did in the run-up to the 2011 
parliamentary elections to justify their arguments and discuss with the voters. Clearly, 
they were successful in capturing something in these labels and using them in justifying 
their positions in a way that could be accepted by many, considering the amount of 
votes they received. In what follows, I will draw together my findings of this political 
process. In doing so, I will use some of my own labels and some I have drawn from 
academic literature. 
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I set out to answer the following questions: How is Finnish political culture and his-
tory visible in the way the European populist phenomenon takes its shape in the PS? 
Is the PS geographically divided to a rural part with SMP rural populist roots and 
an urban part in line with the contemporary European populist radical right? I 
hypothesized that rural candidates would, in the vein of the legacy of the SMP, match 
the literature on rural populism, while the urban candidates could be analysed by re-
search on the contemporary populist radical right. The rural populist side would be 
more left-wing and justify their positions with civic and domestic arguments, while the 
urban side would consist of right-wing candidates justifying with market and domestic 
arguments. Rural populists were expected to hark back to the “sacred farm” (MacRae 
1969) as their mythical heartland (Taggart 2004), whereas for the urban PS, the heart-
land would be a pre-globalization, pre-immigration Finland. Such questions could be 
answered by an analysis of the HS Voting Advice Application, exceptionally published 
as open data online. From my data, I picked PS candidates’ responses to seven ques-
tions on three themes: economic redistribution, regionalism and globalization. 
In questions of economic redistribution and social justice, PS candidates voiced their 
opinions strongly in defence of the welfare state. However, rural candidates used anti-
elitist justifications typical of populism more often, whereas a right-wing liberalist posi-
tion favouring market competition and achievement was more popular in cities, even 
though it constituted a minority even in the urban group. This was fairly in line with the 
hypotheses and was found in both the more general question on income equality and the 
more specific one discussing child benefits. 
Moving on to the second theme, regionalism, most respondents supported the independ-
ence and autonomy of peripheral municipalities strongly and opposed state-led mergers. 
This was true of both urban and rural candidates, but even a larger majority of the rural 
ones. They justified their arguments primarily with the industrial order of worth, that is, 
efficiency, in a typically Finnish way. Candidates argued that state-led initiatives to 
merge municipal administrations were ill-founded because actual savings would be 
marginal or non-existent. Often, this was combined with civic justifications highlighting 
democracy on a local level. Justifications appealing to local ways of life and traditions 
74 
 
were rare. There was, however, a significant urban faction of candidates who were in 
favour of state-initiated mergers of municipalities and based their arguments on eco-
nomic efficiency, which highlights the dividedness of the party on this issue. 
Finally, to discuss the third theme, the globalization questions took up immigration, 
national tradition and the Euro crisis. I found that most PS candidates had very sceptical 
views on immigration. They argued that decisions should be made on the basis of a cal-
culation of consequences for Finland and its economy, and openly criticized altruistic 
motives. Especially the urban candidates underlined this “industrial” stance to immigra-
tion policy. For the second question on globalization, regarding a Christian-themed song 
as part of public schools’ spring festivities, the candidates strongly defended the posi-
tion of this national tradition. This was, again, true especially of urban candidates. Fi-
nally, regarding the Euro crisis, the respondents were strongly opposed to Finland sup-
porting the crisis countries. This position was justified either by blaming banks and 
bankers, blaming the crisis countries themselves, or by underlining the markets’ capa-
bility of dealing with such issues. Blaming the Southern crisis countries and emphasiz-
ing market responsibility were more typically urban justifications, whereas anti-banker 
anti-elitism was used equally by both geographical groups. 
I identified market-oriented right-wing economic liberalist responses, notably differing 
from the mainstream of PS candidates, from a group of respondents. In more than one 
question, they were found by Jussi Halla-aho, Tomi Antila, Juho Eerola, Simon Elo, 
Juhani Mönkkönen and Teemu Lahtinen. All are men, urban and under 40. Three of 
these six candidates (Halla-aho, Eerola and Lahtinen) were among the 13 PS candidates 
who signed an “immigration critical election programme” (Nuiva Vaalimanifesti 2011), 
and two of the six (Halla-aho and Eerola) were elected. This group of candidates differs 
notably from the political mainstream of the PS, which is why I have identified them 
here. 
While the mainstream of the PS was, indeed, left-wing in their economic policy, they 
had strong nationalistic views, typically associated with the political right, in questions 
of immigration, national cultural heritage and European economic integration. Mouffe 
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(1999) has attributed the recent popularity of radical right populism to alternative-
lacking consensual politics, while remaining hopeful of similar advancements on the 
left. The PS are fuelled by their opposition to the consensual acceptance of globalization. 
In their nationalism and conservatism, however, they are decidedly non-socialist, and 
clearly not what Mouffe placed her optimism in, citing “a globalization aiming at a dif-
ferent world order, where inequalities would be drastically reduced, and where the con-
cerns of the most exposed groups would be addressed” (ibid., 71). The PS candidates I 
studied wish for such advancements in a nationally exclusive fashion. 
With these results, a critical reflection on the data used should be noted. Parliamentary 
candidates of a party, especially a fairly young protest party, form quite a broad and 
heterogeneous group for study. On the one hand, this is an advantage, because by study-
ing justifications of candidates, one can search a deeper understanding than just by 
studying elected representatives, who do not constitute the whole picture of the party. 
On the other hand, however, the criteria for candidacy are not very strict, and the data 
includes marginal candidates that did not receive much media attention or votes. If one 
were to include an analysis of which candidates were elected, it would be possible to 
analyse both the “supply” side of the party, what was offered to the voters, and the “de-
mand” side, or which claims were deemed most appealing by voters. 
The research at hand does confirm my hypotheses to a certain extent, but with some 
crucial corrections. First, the ideal-typical and dichotomic nature of the hypothetical 
model is inaccurate and blurs our understanding of some key features of urban and rural 
PS candidates. While there indeed are more opinions corresponding to radical right-
wing populism amongst the urban PS candidates, they constitute an isolated bloc. A vast 
majority of the urban candidates in the 2011 parliamentary elections are better described 
as left-populists, if a label needs to be attached. The “heartland” for most of them is 
clearly not pre-globalization rural monocultural Finland, but a pre-neoliberalist welfare 
state (March 2007, 67). There was, indeed, the group of candidates advocating market-
liberal right-wing policy, and that group was urban, but it was a minority. The differ-
ence between the mainstream of rural candidates and urban candidates was not that no-
table in policy on a left–right scale, but rural candidates did indeed posit populist anti-
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elitist arguments more often. These referenced the unjust position of elites, placing 
worth in the purity and wisdom of the “ordinary” people, typical for populism (e.g. La-
clau 2005a, 2005b; Mudde 2006; Taggart 2004). 
Secondly, a gender aspect was entirely missing from my hypothetical model, but turned 
out to be essential. Just as important as the rural/urban divide in pinpointing the radical 
right populist bloc within PS candidates was gender. Almost all excerpts of responses 
that I coded as liberalist right in economic terms, or radical right in terms of nationalist 
identitarianism (Betz & Johnson 2004, 316–320), or otherwise pinpointed in the radical 
right populist group, were by men. Mostly, they were by the group of men focused on 
immigration issues formed around the controversial candidate Jussi Halla-aho. This 
finding could be interpreted through an analysis taking gender into account. How, ex-
actly, cannot be answered in the constraints of this study, but is of crucial interest for 
further research. 
However, and constituting the third and final critical correction to the hypothetical 
model, there were differences between the rural and urban candidates in the usage of 
justifications in several questions, but results regarding this were inconclusive. For ex-
ample, rural candidates opted more often for domestic justifications in the immigration 
question, whereas urban candidates used industrial ones more often, but in the Suvivirsi 
question on national tradition, urban candidates used domestic justifications more often. 
Both rural and urban candidates sometimes used industrial justifications to “escape” 
stances based on human rights or civic justification. This varied from question to ques-
tion, and would require further study. 
However, a difference in justification that could be discerned was that rural candidates 
used populist arguments, making reference to caricatures and extremes to construct a 
people vs. the elite setting, more often than urban ones, as hypothesized. Analysis of 
populism through a frame of political sociology would benefit from moving from an 
analysis of the regime of public justification to a more thorough utilization of 
Thévenot’s later sociology of engagements (Thévenot 2007, 2011a, 2011b). I found 
examples of appeals to familiar cultural commonplaces, consistent with Thévenot’s re-
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gime of personal affinities. These examples highlighted the difficulty populist political 
actors face in employing the grammar of familiarity in a polity that expects raising the 
level of generality of issues onto the public level and using a grammar of public justifi-
cation. Instead of dismissing populism as “primitivist” (MacRae 1969), simplifying or 
demagogic, we should note that the PS’ populism often speaks of things in a grammar 
of personal closeness, which is generally not accepted of political argumentation on a 
parliamentary level. In speaking of their personal affinities to national commonplaces, 
the candidates used a grammar that is not generally accepted in the mainstream polity, 
making communication between these spheres difficult. This is a new way to conceptu-
alize populism through a toolkit of political sociology and is worth further thought. 
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Appendix 1. Helsingin Sanomat Voting Advice Application 
Questionnaire for Parliamentary Elections 2011 
Background 
1. Constituency 
2. Party 
3. Surname 
4. First name 
5. Age on election day 
6. Gender 
7. Independent candidate, yes/no 
8. Province 
9. Education 
10. Introduction 
11. Local councillor, yes/no 
12. Member of parliament, yes/no 
13. MEP, yes/no 
14. Occupation 
15. Website 
16. RSS Feed 
Questions 
1. Since the mid-1990’s, income inequality has increased rapidly. How would you 
respond to this? 
2. In 2009, the parliament passed a law that legalizes intrafamily adoption for gay 
and lesbian couples. Should gay and lesbian couples also have the right to adop-
tion from outside the family? 
3. In spring 2010, the government granted two nuclear power licenses. The third 
applicant, Fortum, was denied one, but hopes to receive permission from the 
next government to replace two reactors in the Loviisa plant. Should Fortum be 
granted the license? 
4. Child benefit is paid for each child living in Finland up to the age of 17 regard-
less of the parents’ income. What should be done with child benefits? 
5. The social and health ministry is preparing a so-called elderly people law, which 
will possibly include consistent quality requirements and a service guarantee for 
elderly care. Should the “care guarantee” for elderly people be written in the law, 
obligating municipalities to provide a subjective right to care for elderly people? 
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6. The retirement age is currently 63–68 years. The lower limit should be a) low-
ered, b) kept as it is, c) raised by one year or d) raised by more than one year. 
7. Finns currently retire, on average, at under 60. The most significant reason for 
premature retirement is incapacity for work. In addition to supporting coping at 
work and improvements to work welfare, other means have been suggested to 
raise the average retirement age. Which means would you prioritize? 
8. Pensions are raised by the so-called folded index. This means that the consumer 
price index is weighted at 80% and the wage trend at 20%. Because of this sys-
tem, used since the mid-1990’s, pensioners’ income has not risen at the same 
rate as wages. What should be done with the folded index? 
9. The government formed after the election may decide to make cuts to state 
spending. A list of different-sized savings suggestions already made in the elec-
toral discussion follows. Which would you choose first? 
10. With the other Euro countries, Finland has taken part in bailing out countries in 
crisis by hundreds of billions of Euros. In the spring 2010, Finland agreed to 
lend 1,6 billion Euros to Greece. Additionally, Finland promised to back up the 
750 billion loan standby package of the European stability mechanism by over 8 
billion Euros, if needed. Finland may still have to increase the amount of its loan 
securities. What are your views on this? 
11. The discussion of taxing the financial sector and obligating it to take part in pay-
ing for the costs of the crisis has grown increasingly salient with the financial 
crisis. The European Commission has suggested a global financial transaction 
tax, which would apply to bond, stock, currency and derivative trading. What 
are your views on this? 
12. Which tax hikes would you be prepared to implement? 
13. The state uses taxation not only for revenue but also to further different societal 
goals. The actions of citizens can be guided with different exemptions from 
taxation. In 2009, exemptions cost 13 billion Euros. This is roughly a fourth of 
the state budget. Money spent on exemptions has to be raised by hikes in other 
taxes. Which tax exemptions would you cut first? 
14. What should be done with tax-exempt mortgage interest payments? 
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15. Plotted land is taxed, whether built or unbuilt. Should forest land and arable land 
be taxed as well? 
16. In Europe, male conscription is implemented only in Greece, Cyprus and Fin-
land. What should be done with conscription? 
17. Should Finland apply for NATO membership? 
18. Should Finland emphasize human rights and the state of democracy more in its 
foreign policy regarding China and Russia? 
19. Early this year, Russia banned foreign ownership of land near its borders. Rus-
sians can buy land and property in Finland with almost no restrictions. Russians 
have bought thousands of properties in Finland during the past few years. What 
should be done about this? 
20. Finland is committed to the UN objective to raise developmental aid spending 
up to 0.7% of GNP by 2015. Last year, Finland spent 965.6 million Euros on 
developmental aid, which is 0.55% of GNP. What should be done with devel-
opmental aid? 
21. If Finland was on Facebook, which three countries should it send friend requests 
to first? 
22. The weapons law was tightened in the autumn of 2010, e.g. the age limit for 
handguns was raised to 20 years. What should the new parliament do with the 
weapons law? 
23. In addition to their first language, schoolchildren are taught at least two lan-
guages, one of which is the one of Finland’s two official languages, Finnish and 
Swedish, that is not the student’s first language. Should studying the other offi-
cial language be made optional? 
24. Should Suvivirsi be sung at schools’ spring festivities? [A traditional Finnish 
spring-themed song thought by some to be unsuitable for multicultural schools 
because of Christian religious content in its lyrics.] 
25. During the parliamentary term 2007–2011, immigration policy was tightened by 
several separate decisions. Do you feel that Finland’s current immigration policy 
is too strict, agreeable, or too slack? 
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26. The Saimaa ringed seal is critically endangered. Its total population is currently 
roughly 270, and some estimate its extinction highly likely. The Saimaa ringed 
seal protection in the last few years has been based mostly on voluntary action, 
such as voluntary fishing restrictions. How should protection be organized? 
27. In the last few years, municipalities have outsourced services to private compa-
nies and third sector actors. The pressures for outsourcing are mounting. What is 
your view on outsourcing municipal services? 
28. The amount of municipalities has been reduced by consolidation to 336. The aim 
is efficiency in administration, as many small municipalities are struggling to 
cope with producing the legally required services. What would be the right 
amount of municipalities? 
29. Consolidating the administrations of the Helsinki metropolitan area cities has 
been debated for quite some time. The supporters of the plan argue that consoli-
dation would be beneficial to land use and transport planning. Helsinki’s admin-
istration supports consolidation, but the neighboring cities, Espoo and Vantaa 
are against it. The future parliament and government can have their say on this. 
What should be done? 
30. The state redistributes tax revenue so that money is distributed from the wealthy 
municipalities to the less well-off ones. This system guarantees a tax revenue 
level for every municipality that equals 91.86% of the average tax revenue of 
Finnish municipalities. The biggest net payers are Helsinki and Espoo, which 
pay roughly 500 million of their municipality tax revenue to be transferred to 
less well-off municipalities. How would you respond to this? 
31. Mention three parties that should be in the next government. 
Translations by author of this study. 
  
88 
 
Appendix 2. Tables 
Table 9. Rural and urban response rates to each question (%)8 
Rural Urban Total 
Analysis I: Economic Redistribution and Social Justice 
      Question 1: Income Equality 68 76 73 
      Question 4: Child Benefit 68 70 69 
Analysis II: Regionalism 
      Question 28: Consolidating Municipalities 69 53 58 
      Question 30: Regional Levelling of Tax Revenue 48 47 47 
Analysis III: Globalization       
      Question 25: Immigration 58 63 61 
      Question 24: Suvivirsi 49 46 47 
      Question 10: The Euro Crisis 59 64 62 
N 71 131 202 
Table 10. Gender distribution of rural and urban respondents (%) 
Rural Urban Total 
Male 69 64 66 
Female 31 36 34 
N 71 131 202 
Table 11. Age distribution of rural and urban respondents (%) 
Rural Urban Total 
Did not answer 8 8 8 
–29 4 8 11 
30–39 10 14 21 
40–49 28 24 41 
50–59 30 22 39 
60–69 20 20 33 
70– 5 6 
N 71 131 202 
                                                 
8 The percentages are calculated of the total number of respondents that answered the questionnaire by 
written comments, and were thus included in this study, shown on the bottom row. As 85% of all PS 
candidates did so, a response percentage calculated of total PS candidates would be slightly lower. 
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Table 12. Educational level distribution of rural and urban respondents (%)9 
Rural Urban Total 
Did not answer 6 8 7 
Kansakoulu/alle (primary school or less) 6 4 4 
Perus-/keskikoulu (secondary school) 4 3 3 
Opistoaste (vocational training) 23 18 19 
Lukio/ammattikoulu (upper secondary school or 28 23 25 
                                vocational school) 
Alempi korkea-aste (lower university degree) 13 20 17 
Ylempi korkea-aste (higher university degree) 15 18 17 
Tutkijakoulutus (Doctorate) 6 7 6 
N 71 131 202 
 
                                                 
9 Because educational systems differ, and the classification used in the data includes obsolete historical 
educational institutions, translations are not precise. 
